【Joshua Wong's speech in Frankfurt Book Fair —— 出席全球最大圖書博覽會 呼籲世界關注十二手足】
座談會二十分鐘英文講稿全記錄:https://www.patreon.com/posts/43059474
自透過企鵝出版社(Penguin Publisher)在十個國家以八種語言發行我的個人傳記《Unfree Speech》,不時也會透過視像方式跟各地讀者交流。近來最深刻的,莫過於是被法蘭克福書展(Frankfurt Book Fair)邀請,能在這個全球最大國際圖書博覽會舉辦新書座談,跟各地書商和傳媒機構代表交流,實在十分榮幸。
在新書座談會裡,主持問到我如何評估目前選舉被押後的狀況,我多番強調如今存在的根本只是一個違憲議會(I’d never see the cancellation of election as a ‘postponement’, the election is de facto CALLED OFF, not postponed. The way that Beijing stepped in and appointed the “provisional legislature” implied our parliament is replaced by an unconstitutional appointment);而如何應對港府意圖在大陸設置票站,進一步助長中共操控選舉,必然是本地和海外公民社會均需要留意的關鍵議題。
當論及歐洲各國與中國的外交關系,我強調即使國際領袖置促成投資與貿易協議於首位,也不代表他們能夠繼續抱著這種「not-in-my-backyard mentality」。當西方國家在過去數十年寄望以對話、交流和合作促進中國改革,如今卻換來倒行逆施的狀況,如何在後國安法年代調整其對中政策,予中國意識到戰狼外交並非出路,確是相當重要。
雖然不少座談會上提到的議題,對香港社會來說已是耳熟能詳,但可以在這個歷史悠久,自十七世紀已舉辦的大型書展,呼籲大家關注十二位香港人的狀況,也是得來不易,如有興趣的話也可以細閱我的一萬字英文講稿,應該會對我如何向國際社會講述香港故事,會有更整全的理解。
Retweet:https://twitter.com/joshuawongcf/status/1319526854076682240
I recalled in last year a high-level official from a European country had openly said they don’t want to ‘’interfere in other people's issues", despite the fact that companies of that country played a part in the brutality of Hong Kong police by supplying police vehicles. It is a typical display of the not-in-my-backyard mentality. However, we are living in a connected world. Hong Kong can serve as a story to learn from. We were unaware of the Chinese regime's intention to gain influence and control over our economy in the early years. And our economy now is to some extent too reliant on China, which makes our battle for freedom and democracy harder.
There are calls for more cooperation between European governments and China to ‘guide’ the regime towards democratic norms. But to me, these are only concessions. it is proven multiple times in terms of trade, digital security or in territorial disputes that the communist government is not a responsible country who plays by the rules. I see no point of aiding and assisting the greatest threat to human rights to expand its scale of violence in HK and Xinjiang. Trade and economic activities are indispensable, but perhaps we should emphasize more on ‘reciprocity’ -- more principle-based and value-based instead of money-driven, just do business with conscience and make the righteous decisions.
There are certainly more cherished values that deserve more genuine recognition than investment deal negotiation. But before any right things are done, it is high time we understand what is true from what is wrong. The case of Hong Kong is already a lesson proven painful. A relationship built on lies will not be trusted and sustainable.
To sum up, I’m sure it would be helpful to devote continuing attention to the development in Hong Kong, no matter regarding the twelve detained activists in China or state targets like myself. Also, confronting against Chinese propaganda and lies is also a way to stand with people of Hong Kong. It is the high time these values were acknowledged. We hope the world continues to speak up when our voices are silenced.
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✍️聯署要求送返十二名被捕港人:https://bit.ly/save12youthspetitions
💪小額支持我的獨家分析及文章:https://bit.ly/joshuawonghk
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同時也有10000部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過2,910的網紅コバにゃんチャンネル,也在其Youtube影片中提到,...
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【#TheDiplomat🌍】難得The Diplomat讀者對香港有興趣:
The series of iron-fisted moves last month in Hong Kong may seem sudden to international observers: Hong Kong government’s earlier reinterpretation of the China-Hong Kong relationship, the election of a pro-Beijing legislator to be a Legislative Council chair through a controversial mechanism, and Beijing’s recent decision to impose a national security law on Hong Kong. The desire to bring Hong Kong under the banner of “one country, one system” is not impulsive. Quite the contrary, it’s a calculated campaign to initiate a so-called “second reunification with Hong Kong” — since the first reunification after the handover, using a lenient soft-power approach, has supposedly failed.
What are Beijing’s calculations that motivate this bold campaign now? And more important, will the campaign work?
While I remain highly skeptical of solely applying the realist framework to study Hong Kong, Beijing’s mentality is nonetheless entirely realism-driven. It is therefore essential to use this lens to understand more of their thoughts.
COVID-19: A Golden Opportunity on the International Stage?
To start with, the coronavirus pandemic seems to have created an ideal backdrop for Beijing to push forward its iron-fisted policy toward Hong Kong. The West has been devastated by the pandemic, more so than China, and has been slower to recover economically. Instead of decoupling from China, Beijing thinks the West is desperate for an influx of Chinese capital and markets. This notion encourages Beijing to pursue brinkmanship, in the form of confrontative “wolf warrior diplomacy,” its escalation of sharp power, and, most recently, Hong Kong’s national security law. As long as the international community does not put their condemnation into action, Beijing will keep pushing the envelope.
Beijing is convinced that the chambers of commerce representing other countries in Hong Kong will always place profits above all else as long as the national security law does not threaten them. Business deals struck at the crucial moment can entice foreign businesses to use their lobby teams in their home countries in Beijing’s favor.
Although anti-China sentiment has become more mainstream, Beijing, the major beneficiary of globalization in the past two decades, has tied its destiny with various elites internationally. These “friends of China” can be swayed to safeguard Beijing’s interests, but the up-and-coming leaders in many countries look less friendly. Therefore, the window of opportunity for Beijing to act is closing before the new value-driven generation comes to power.
The Lack of Incentive Behind the U.S. and U.K.’s Escalating Rhetoric
While U.S. politicians from left to right are vocal against China, their ultimate goal, Beijing believes, is to win votes in the November election. They would hence avoid hurting the interest groups they represent and go easy on actions aiming to punish China, such as denying Hong Kong’s status as a separate customs territory, sanctioning Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong, or escalating the trade war.
Even though the Trump administration is ramping up the rhetoric to sanction China, protecting Hong Kong’s autonomy is not one of the United States’ core interests. In contrast, having control over Hong Kong is China’s core interest. Beijing would rather make concessions over other disputes with Washington in exchange for claiming victory in Hong Kong for its internal propaganda.
Britain, the co-signer of the Joint Declaration for Hong Kong’s handover, is arguably most entitled to denounce Beijing’s violation, which would give mandates to the United States to act. But Beijing is convinced that Britain, not as powerful as it used to be, will not make such a move. Beijing’s recent plans to withdraw businesses from the United States and list them in the London stock market is a move to place a wedge between the two powers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s unilateralism and his harsh stance against U.S. allies also strengthens Beijing’s conviction that the West will not follow the United States’ lead.
Beijing’s Divide and Conquer Strategy in Hong Kong
Hong Kong’s parliament, the Legislative Council (LegCo), is a major roadblock to Beijing’s control, as demonstrated twice since the handover — in 2003 when the national security law was first introduced and in 2019 with the anti-extradition legislation that sparked city-wide protests. In both setbacks, Beijing lost control when moderate pro-establishment legislators broke away from the party line in the face of public outcry. As the September LegCo election approaches, the last thing Beijing wants is for the election to become a de facto referendum on the single issue of the national security law, which could result in another landslide win for the democratic parties. The law would be untenable to the international community if it’s opposed by both pro-democracy voters, which according to polls account for 60 percent of the votes, and moderate pro-establishment voters.
The moderates, despite their reluctance to embrace hardline rule in Hong Kong, differ from the more militant faction within the non-establishment camp in that the former rejects the so-called “mutual destruction” option, which risks Hong Kong’s special trade status — its economic lifeline — as a bargaining tactic to force Beijing to back off. Now that Washington is considering withdrawing Hong Kong’s privileges, the possibility of mutual destruction is becoming real. As Beijing has been promoting a narrative that all supporters of the protest movement’s “Five Demands” are bringing about mutual destruction, Beijing hopes the moderates, in fear of losing their financial assets, might turn toward the establishment.
On the other hand, the pro-democracy camp is at risk of breaking apart. Moderate pro-democracy supporters have been going to rallies to keep up with the political momentum. However, marches with more than a million participants would be impossible under the current oppressive environment. For example, the authorities abuse COVID-19 social distancing measures to suppress rallies, permits for peaceful protests are increasingly difficult to obtain, pro-establishment businesses heavily censored the social media activities of employees, and outspoken individuals are often cyberbullied.
Without support from the moderates, some within the pro-democracy camp may radicalize, as Beijing expects. The radicalization would fit Beijing’s tactic of painting protests as separatism and terrorism, justifying the imposition of the national security law. The trajectory would be similar to Beijing’s handling of the 1959 Tibetan “riots,” during which Mao Zedong’s directive was “the more chaotic the scene, the better.”
The Nationalistic Agenda to Divert Domestic Attention
But after all, to Beijing, Hong Kong is not just Hong Kong. In the wake of the pandemic, Beijing urgently needs to uphold nationalism to divert unwanted attention from its economic crisis. That includes a global propaganda campaign to promote its triumph over COVID-19. Upgrading the Hong Kong protests to a national security issue — as a battle against foreign interference to complete the “reunification with Hong Kong” — best suits the nationalist atmosphere. The all-time low sense of belonging with China among the new generation in Hong Kong further justifies a strong-arm approach. The success of the strategy would offer a way to reunite with Taiwan, which would consolidate Xi’s leadership within the Communist Party.
Also, including the Hong Kong issue as part of the national agenda means that the Hong Kong government, which has already lost its will to govern, will dance to Beijing’s tunes.
This comprehensive crackdown on Hong Kong’s civil society is unprecedented. Beijing believes that the heavy-handed approach would pervade Hong Kong with a sense of powerlessness and bring it to its knees. As long as the international response is limited, the execution of the national security law, according to Chairman Mao’s “theory of contradiction,” will follow a script of “a soft hand” and “a firm hand.” That is, after its imposition, the law will initially apply restraint and be used only on individuals to set a stern example, so that the general public would feel as if the law does not impact them at all and property and stock prices would not fall. Gradually and subtly, if the realist formula of Beijing works, the “second reunification” could become a self-proclaimed success story for Beijing’s propaganda.
However, Beijing’s evaluations are not foolproof. Any single miscalculation could lead to a contradictory outcome for the People’s Republic of China. Is it really prepared?
▶️ 國安法:中國的現實主義框架
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HjhRbV8qTgo
⏺ 中美夏威夷峰會
https://www.patreon.com/posts/38378214
de facto relationship 在 陳冠廷 Kuan-Ting Chen Facebook 的精選貼文
OFFICIAL STATEMENT
Re “Why Taiwan’s Presidential Election Is so Crucial” (the editor’s blog, page, April 10):
The accusation that Taipei City Mayor Ko Wen-je is “dangerously pro Chinese” is both unfounded and incorrect.
Certainly, Mayor Ko would like to have a friendly relationship with China. However, Mayor Ko would never sacrifice the friendship of the United States and Japan, who remain Taiwan’s strongest allies.
During his recent United States visit, Mayor Ko emphatically reiterated his support for the continued development of Taiwan’s bilateral relationship with the United States.
Furthermore, Mayor Ko opposes any attempts by China to influence Taiwan’s democratic processes. In this regard, his views diverge from the Kuomintang, whose chairman recently proposed a bilateral peace agreement that many in Taiwan believe would undermine our de-facto sovereignty.
Let there be no doubt that Mayor Ko seeks to ensure Taiwan remains both free and democratic with the United States an important ally.
Fellow Taiwanese, do not worry, Mayor Ko will not provoke China nor will Mayor Ko provoke any other one of our neighbors in the Asia-Pacific.
We welcome exchange, we welcome communication.
We will never engage in dialogue out of fear, but let us never be afraid to engage in dialogue.
關於美國《華盛頓自由燈塔》“為什麼台灣的總統選舉如此重要”
這篇文章對市長柯文哲的評論,是不正確的。
柯文哲市長希望與中國建立友善關係,然而這並不代表柯市長會犧牲台灣與美國和日本的友誼,美國和日本仍然是台灣最重要的盟國夥伴。
上一次的訪美行,柯市長再次強調並且多次重申,全力支持台灣與美國的雙邊關係,持續正面發展。
此外,柯市長反對中國試圖影響台灣民主進程或者是主權的企圖。在這方面,他的觀點與中國國民黨不同。中國國民黨提出考慮與中國政府簽訂和平協議方案,讓許多國人認為,這將侵蝕台灣的實質主權。
請各位國人朋友,不要懷疑,柯市長致力於與美國,我們重要的盟友夥伴,一起確保台灣的民主以及自由。
也請各位國人朋友不要擔心,柯市長不會挑釁中國大陸,以及我們其他在亞太的鄰國。
我們歡迎交流,鼓勵溝通,不會在恐懼下對話,但也不會恐懼對話。
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