關於 u.s. stock list ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

整理得很好

【**川普做了哪些40年來其他總統沒做的事?**】中共就是這幾任包括柯林頓，小布希，歐巴馬給搞到為所欲為，不管川普是否連任，這4年能夠把中共搞到崩潰邊緣，他真的不簡單!

**這裡整理幾點，他做了那些前任總統沒做的事?**

**1. 讓反共成為美國共識:**
* 正式公開承認過去幾十年對中政策的錯誤，並將中國與中共分開，認定中共所領導的中國為「有別於民主」的獨裁國家，視其為「新威權主義」

**2. 讓反共成為民主自由國家共識:**
* 呼籲並整合西方國家，在民主自由與極權暴政之間只能選邊站，價值觀勝過經濟誘因
* 在這次疫情，願意第一個出來講真話，讓我們不用活在指鹿為馬的世界，指出就是因為中共隱匿疫情，造成全球染疫超過千萬，死亡超過50萬人，經濟停擺，損失無可計算，四億多全職工作消失不復返，生活模式改變
* 甚至，他點出了 [#宗教自由](https://www.facebook.com/…/%E5%AE%97%E6%95%99%E8%87%AA%E7%9…)，喚醒我們與中共的差別，西方民主國家不要忘記我們的價值觀，行善止惡的重要性

**3. 斷絕中共資金來源:**
* 進行貿易戰，提高關稅，迫使各國紛出走中國
* 提供優惠措施，輔導美企出走中國
* 嚴審中概股，逼迫中企會計公開透明，被迫在自由市場滅頂
* 限制經由香港的資金流動
* 對中國敏感科高科技出口禁令擴展到香港
* 下令美聯邦退休基金撤出中國，禁止用美國公務及老兵的退休基金去投資中國，使其製造武器來威脅美國人/士兵生命，過去幾任總統都是這樣做
* 美國八成假貨來自中港，不但危害智慧產權，消費者安全，更打擊市場公平性，川普對這些產品進行關稅制裁
* 進行《香港自治法》的簽署: 潛在制裁對象還首度包括國際金融機構，可導致中港銀行無法與美國銀行交易、不能使用美元結算，以打擊中港方資金鏈

**4. 斷絕中共技術來源，消滅「中國製造2025」:**
* 抵制中興、華為及與中共及解放軍有關係的中企
* 阻斷中國晶片來源，沒了心臟，所有設備根本出不了中國
* 對美國涉及千人計劃的學者、科學家開鍘，並對源頭中國駐美使館進行公開譴責
* 反制習近平「軍民融合戰略」竊取高科技，針對中國公民和學生進行簽證禁令，禁止具任何解放軍背景公民、學生與研究人員的再入境，撤銷簽證，甚至逮捕，一解放軍軍官以學術研究到美，在機場被捕，面臨最高10年刑期
* 正在進行「年度國防授權法案 (NDAA)」的簽署: 公布竊取美商業機密、威脅國家安全或經濟健康的個人或公司名單，[#向竊取技術的企業實施懲罰](https://www.facebook.com/…/%E5%90%91%E7%AB%8A%E5%8F%96%E6%8…)，包括凍結他們在美國的資產，及禁止美國公民與這些公司和個人進行交易的制裁，還包括加強美國供應鏈的措施，以及擴大與中國導彈防禦系統整合的限制

**5. 5G:**
* 正式宣布華為國安威脅，目前世界已有多國正式宣布不用華為進行5G基礎建設，這對全世界各國國家安全極為重要，菲律賓即因電網用華為設備，中共可遠端停電菲律賓48小時
* 美憂中國監視及竊盜資料，海纜准通台灣，不准通香港

**6. 印太戰略**
* 美國對中國擴張問題，不再只是內容空泛的抱怨，反而是堅強的執行意志。從新加坡李顯龍公開表示，希望華府不要逼新加坡與東協在美、中兩國選邊，很明顯就是針對美國印太戰略在發言
* 美國正在亞太地區部署前所未見的軍力，目前美軍部署在亞太地區的兵力為37.5萬人，占美軍總兵力的28%，其中包括60%的海軍艦艇、55%的陸軍部隊，以及2/3的陸戰隊兵力
* 美國前總統歐巴馬8年任期中，在南海只執行4次航行自由行動，然而川普上任迄今四年已執行22次，是歐巴馬的11倍

**7. 台灣**
* 稱蔡英文為台灣總統，國務卿蓬佩奧公開稱讚台灣在民主自由的貢獻，並支持台灣加入WHO等國際組織
* 台灣被確認是美國印太戰略核心夥伴，公開邀請參加八月南海軍演
* 2016年共和黨首度將《六項保證》納入黨綱
* 《台北法案》: 內容涵蓋台灣對外關係、美台經貿關係和台灣參與國際組織，增強美台雙邊經貿關係，並要求美政府促進台灣國際參與
* 《2018年亞洲再保證倡議法》其中第209條款「對台灣之承諾」重申支持美國與台灣在政治、經濟及安全的合作，規定「美國總統應依來自中國之威脅而定期對台軍售」
* 《台灣旅行法》: 促進兩國高層交流
* 重啟台美FTA談判
* 美方加強參與台灣國艦國造
* 軍售台灣: 18枚MK-48 AT重型魚雷，66架F-16戰機，派里級巡防艦、AAV7兩棲突擊車、人攜刺針飛彈250枚、拖式2B型飛彈769枚、標槍飛彈及迅安系統後續支援，HARM反輻射飛彈50枚、聯合距外武器（JSOW）空對地飛彈56枚、MK48魚雷46枚、標準二型（SM-2）飛彈16枚、MK54輕型魚雷168枚、4艘紀德級驅逐艦AN /SLQ-32（V）3電戰系統性能提升、SRP偵蒐雷達後續維持、MK41垂直發射系統，C-130 運輸機、F-5 戰鬥機、經國號戰鬥機，M1A2T戰車、M88A2裝甲救濟車、M1070A1 重裝備運輸車、M1000 重裝備運輸板車、FIM-92刺針便攜式防空飛彈、122把M2重機槍、216把M240通用機槍
* 進行《台灣防衛法》的簽署: 確保美軍有能力保護台灣安全，包括評估採取有限核武來嚇阻中國

**8. 香港**
* 制裁傷害香港自治的中港官員，包括: 中共政治局常委，負責港澳事務的韓正，加速中共高層內部的分裂
* 通過《香港人權與民主法》，撤銷香港特別待遇，包括禁止出口軍民兩用技術到香港
* 著手撤銷香港在引渡條例、出口管制、旅遊及獨立關稅區地位等領域所享有的特殊待遇
* 進行《香港自治法》的簽署: 對破壞香港自治的中港官員，凍結其在美資產，禁止入境美國；潛在制裁對象還首度包括國際金融機構，可導致中港銀行無法與美國銀行交易、不能使用美元結算，以打擊中港方資金鏈

**9. 新疆**
* 2019年10月，美國宣布將28個打壓新疆穆斯林的中企列入黑名單
* 2020年5月，美國宣布將中國公安部法醫研究所和8家中企列入經濟黑名單，並將33個協助中國政府監控維族，或與中國解放軍及大規模殺傷性武器有關聯的企業、機構、個人列入黑名單
* 通過《2020 年維吾爾人權政策法案》，呼籲禁止在中國境內外對這些族群的任意拘留、酷刑和騷擾，將制裁監禁超過百萬穆斯林的中國官員，制裁手段包括：凍結中國有關官員的在美財產、拒絶他們入境、拒發或取消簽證

**10. 媒體:**
* 今年2月，美國已將新華社、中國環球電視網（CGTN）、中國國際廣播電台（CRI）、《中國日報》發行公司，以及《人民日報》發行商美國海天發展公司列為外國使團
* 今年3月，美國要求削減60位中國籍記者
* 今年4月，白宮史無前例地批評美國之音為中國政府做宣傳。新任執行長在6月初通過國會核准，原本貝內特（Amanda Bennet）在內多名美國之音高管宣佈辭職
* 今年5月，美國限制中國籍記者簽證90天
* 今年5月，川普與推特等社群媒體槓上，怒斥打壓言論自由
* 今年7月，新增4家中共官媒為外國使團，包括: 中央電視台（CCTV）、中國新聞社（中新社）、《人民日報》和《環球時報》，從此需向美國國務院提供在美員工的名單及他們在美租賃或持有的房地產清單

**11. 疫情前，2019年底的美國經濟表現**
* 失業率維持在 3.5%，創 1969 年以來新低
* 執政 3 年美股飆逾 50%，高居歷屆總統第一
* 招聘人數的增加和工資的上漲推動了消費者支出，消費者支出占美國經濟的三分之二以上
* 美國是2019年G7唯一經濟增速將超過2%的國家
* 至2019年12月，美國經濟已連續第126個月持續增長，是有記錄以來最長的經濟增長期
* 美國股市的總市值攀升至創紀錄，1.5倍於其GDP
* 強勁的美國經濟在2019年繼續吸引來自世界各地的投資，使美元匯率升至歷史新高

**12. 國際組織**
* 川普大聲譴責目前「過於以中國為中心」的國際機構，包括WHO等
* 以行動退出世衛及拒絕提供資金後，世衛終於在6月30日承認中國並非第一個告知疫情，也就是中共違反世界衛生條例，並沒有在24小時內告知世衛，也代表全球都有法源依據跟中共求償
* 川普政府的國家安全小組甚至在考慮建立一個全新的國際衛生組織，以使美國能擁有更大影響
* WTO秘書長突然在今年5月辭職
* 川普表示: 聯合國是一個過時的組織。暗示應成立一個以民主自由國家，有共同價值觀為前提的組織，並開始邀請各國參加G11

What did Trump do that the former presidents did not do?

1. Making Anti-CCP a consensus in the United States:
* Formally and publicly acknowledged the mistakes of the China policy over the past few decades, separated China from CCP, and regarded China led by CCP as a dictatorship, different from democracy countries

2. Making Anti-CCP a consensus in the democratic and free nations:
* Appealed the democratic and free nations to stand together against CCP. Western countries is forced by CCP to choose side between persistence in freedom and acceptance of Beijing’s bully tactics, between value and economic incentives.
* In this epidemic, told us the fact that it’s because of the CCP’s deliberate concealment, more than 10 million people have been infected, more than 500,000 people have died, more than 400 million full-time jobs have disappeared, and our lifestyle is forced to be changed.
* Pointed out the importance of religious freedom and awakened us the differences between us and the CCP. CCP is a regime that oppresses her people’s religious freedom. Western democracies should not forget our insistence on freedom and beliefs

3. Cut off the sources of CCP funds:
* Carried out trade wars, raised tariffs, forced the companies and the investment to move out of China
* Provided preferential measures to assist US companies to move out of China
* Passed a bill that would prevent companies that refuse to open their books from listing on Wall Street. This move is aimed to "kick deceitful Chinese companies off US exchanges."
* Restrict the flow of funds through Hong Kong
* Directed federal pension fund to halt investments in Chinese stocks
* Imposed tariff sanctions on Chinese fake products
* Passed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act to require the imposition of sanctions on foreign individuals and banks that participate in China’s oppression of Hong Kong

4. Cut off the sources of high-tech technology and knowledge acquired by CCP, and eliminate the possibility of Made in China 2025:
* Boycotted ZTE, Huawei, and the Chinese companies which are related to the CCP and the PLA
* Block CCP's access to acquire the high-end chips
* Arrested the scholars and scientists involved in the Thousand Talents Program, and publicly condemned the Chinese Embassy accused to lead this program in the US
* Ordered a ban on issuing visas to the Chinese people, students and researchers with PLA background, in order to prevent Xi Jinping's "military-civilian integration strategy" from stealing US high technology
* Signed "National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)": published a list of individuals or companies that steal US trade secrets, threaten national security or economic health; Penalize the companies that steal technology, including freezing their US assets; Prohibit U.S. citizens from trading with these companies and individuals...and so on.

5. 5G:
* Barred American firms from selling tech and supplies to huawei without first obtaining a license to do so and restricted companies like TSMC, a Taiwan-based firm, from exporting computer chipsets and other key components to Huawei.
* At the same time, warned the world that Huawei products will pose a risk to their national securities. Now, the tide is turning against Huawei, many countries have given up using Huawei equipments on their 5G instructure.
* According to CNN, because of using huawei equipments, the Philippines' power grid is under the full control of the Chinese government and could be shut off in time of conflict
* Denied Google to use a direct connection between the US and Hong Kong, due to a significant risk to security

6. Indo-Pacific Strategy
* The United States is no longer just complaining about the content of China's expansion, but rather a strong will to execute. Li Xianlong from Singapore stated publicly that he hopes that Washington will not force Singapore and ASEAN to choose sides in the United States and China.
* The United States is deploying unprecedented military power in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, the US military has 375,000 troops deployed in the Asia-Pacific region, accounting for 28% of the total US military strength, including 60% of naval ships, 55% of the army, and around 66% Marine Forces
* During the eight-year term of the former President Obama, only carried out four freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. However, Trump has carried out 22 times in the four years so far, which is 11 times that of Obama.

7. Taiwan
* Ignoring CCP’s intimidation, the secretary of State Pompeo publically and officially called Tsai Ing-wen the President of Taiwan. Also, praised Taiwan’s contribution to democracy and freedom, and supported Taiwan’s accession to WHO and other international organizations
* Publicly announced Taiwan is the core partner of the US-Indo-Pacific Plan, and openly invited Taiwan to participate in August Joint Navy Exercise in South China Sea
* Reiterated the "Six Guarantees" for Taiwan in 2016
* Signed "Taipei Act": It aims to increase the scope of US relations with Taiwan and encourage other nations and international organizations to strengthen their official and unofficial ties with this nation
* Signed "Asian Reassurance Initiative Act 2018" : It aims to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States, to faithfully enforce all existing United States Government commitments to Taiwan, to counter efforts to change the status quo and to support peaceful resolution acceptable to both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to conduct regular arms sales To Taiwan
* Signed "Taiwan Travel Law": It aims to encourage the travel of high level United States officials to Taiwan

8. Hong Kong
* In May 27, 2020, announced by the Secretary of State under the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act that Hong Kong no longer enjoys sufficient autonomy in order to justify special treatment by the US
* In May 28, 2020, announced that the United States would initiate the process of revoking Hong Kong’s favorable treatment under US law
* In July 1st, 2020, passed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act. It’s aimed to provide for mandatory sanctions against individuals, entities and financial institutions in response to China’s National Security Law for Hong Kong.

9. Xinjiang
* China has rounded up at least a million Uighurs in Xinjiang and imprisoned them in what it calls "re-education camps." An investigation found that most of the detainees were imprisoned due to their religious practices and culture, rather than extremist behavior.
* In October 2019, banned the import of products made by a firm in Xinjiang over its use of forced labor, also, blacklisted 28 Chinese entities for their role in the repression of Uighurs and issued visa restrictions on key Chinese officials
* In May 2020, added 33 companies to the United States’ economic blacklist of Chinese companies with ties to China’s military. The Commerce Department explained the banning of these companies, claiming that they are “complicit in human rights violations and abuses committed in China’s campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, forced labor and high-technology surveillance against Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.”
* In signed into a law an act authorizing sanctions against Chinese officials over the mass detention and surveillance of Uighur Muslims in China's western Xinjiang province. The new legislation is the most significant action by any country to punish China over its treatment of ethnic minorities.

10. Media:
* In February, require five Chinese state-run media organizations to register their personnel and property with the U.S. government, granting them a designation akin to diplomatic entities.The five organizations affected are Xinhua News Agency; China Global Television Network, previously known as CCTV; China Radio International; the parent company of China Daily newspaper; and the parent company of The People’s Daily newspaper. All five meet the definitions of "foreign missions" under the Foreign Missions Act, according to the State Department.
* In March, ordered several Chinese media organizations to dismiss 60 U.S.-based Chinese nationals
* In May, reduced the length of work visas for journalists from China employed by non-U.S. media will be to a maximum of 90 days. Chinese reporters can apply for extensions, each one also limited to 90 days
* In the end of May, after Trump's complained reminding, Twitter has flagged a tweet written in March by a Chinese government spokesman that the US military brought the novel Coronavirus to China, as the social media platform ramps up fact-checking of posts.
* In July, announced that four more Chinese media organizations will be treated as foreign diplomatic missions, including: China Central Television (CCTV), China News Service (China News Service), People’s Daily, and Global Times.

11. Before the epidemic, the US economic performance at the end of 2019
* Unemployment rate remains at 3.5%, a new low since 1969
* During Trump’s three years in power, U.S. stocks soared by more than 50%, ranking first among successive presidents
* Increased recruitment and rising wages have driven consumer spending, which accounts for more than two-thirds of U.S. economic output, and its health has helped the economy maintain a stretch of growth that is now in its 11th year.
* In G7 in 2019, the United States is the only country with an economic growth rate of more than 2%
* As of December 2019, the U.S. economy has expanded for a record 126 straight months, the longest time period in the country’s history according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.
* The total market value of the US stock market climbed to a record, 1.5 times GDP
* In 2019, the strong American economy attracts investment from all over the world,bringing the dollar exchange rate to a record high

12. International organizations
* Loudly accused WHO of being very "China-centric" and withdrawn from the WHO by action and refusing to provide funds, the WHO finally admitted on June 30 that it was alerted by its own office in China, and not by China itself, to the first pneumonia cases in Wuhan.
* Trump is even considering to establish a new international health organization to allow the United States to have greater influence
* WTO Secretary-General suddenly resigned in May this year
* Trump even called for reform of outdated United Nations, implying that an new UN organization should based on the common value as democracy and freedom. Hence, he is starting to invite more democratic countries into G7

【#TheDiplomat🌍】難得The Diplomat讀者對香港有興趣：

The series of iron-fisted moves last month in Hong Kong may seem sudden to international observers: Hong Kong government’s earlier reinterpretation of the China-Hong Kong relationship, the election of a pro-Beijing legislator to be a Legislative Council chair through a controversial mechanism, and Beijing’s recent decision to impose a national security law on Hong Kong. The desire to bring Hong Kong under the banner of “one country, one system” is not impulsive. Quite the contrary, it’s a calculated campaign to initiate a so-called “second reunification with Hong Kong” — since the first reunification after the handover, using a lenient soft-power approach, has supposedly failed.

What are Beijing’s calculations that motivate this bold campaign now? And more important, will the campaign work?

While I remain highly skeptical of solely applying the realist framework to study Hong Kong, Beijing’s mentality is nonetheless entirely realism-driven. It is therefore essential to use this lens to understand more of their thoughts.

COVID-19: A Golden Opportunity on the International Stage?

To start with, the coronavirus pandemic seems to have created an ideal backdrop for Beijing to push forward its iron-fisted policy toward Hong Kong. The West has been devastated by the pandemic, more so than China, and has been slower to recover economically. Instead of decoupling from China, Beijing thinks the West is desperate for an influx of Chinese capital and markets. This notion encourages Beijing to pursue brinkmanship, in the form of confrontative “wolf warrior diplomacy,” its escalation of sharp power, and, most recently, Hong Kong’s national security law. As long as the international community does not put their condemnation into action, Beijing will keep pushing the envelope.

Beijing is convinced that the chambers of commerce representing other countries in Hong Kong will always place profits above all else as long as the national security law does not threaten them. Business deals struck at the crucial moment can entice foreign businesses to use their lobby teams in their home countries in Beijing’s favor.

Although anti-China sentiment has become more mainstream, Beijing, the major beneficiary of globalization in the past two decades, has tied its destiny with various elites internationally. These “friends of China” can be swayed to safeguard Beijing’s interests, but the up-and-coming leaders in many countries look less friendly. Therefore, the window of opportunity for Beijing to act is closing before the new value-driven generation comes to power.

The Lack of Incentive Behind the U.S. and U.K.’s Escalating Rhetoric

While U.S. politicians from left to right are vocal against China, their ultimate goal, Beijing believes, is to win votes in the November election. They would hence avoid hurting the interest groups they represent and go easy on actions aiming to punish China, such as denying Hong Kong’s status as a separate customs territory, sanctioning Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong, or escalating the trade war.

Even though the Trump administration is ramping up the rhetoric to sanction China, protecting Hong Kong’s autonomy is not one of the United States’ core interests. In contrast, having control over Hong Kong is China’s core interest. Beijing would rather make concessions over other disputes with Washington in exchange for claiming victory in Hong Kong for its internal propaganda.

Britain, the co-signer of the Joint Declaration for Hong Kong’s handover, is arguably most entitled to denounce Beijing’s violation, which would give mandates to the United States to act. But Beijing is convinced that Britain, not as powerful as it used to be, will not make such a move. Beijing’s recent plans to withdraw businesses from the United States and list them in the London stock market is a move to place a wedge between the two powers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s unilateralism and his harsh stance against U.S. allies also strengthens Beijing’s conviction that the West will not follow the United States’ lead.

Beijing’s Divide and Conquer Strategy in Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s parliament, the Legislative Council (LegCo), is a major roadblock to Beijing’s control, as demonstrated twice since the handover — in 2003 when the national security law was first introduced and in 2019 with the anti-extradition legislation that sparked city-wide protests. In both setbacks, Beijing lost control when moderate pro-establishment legislators broke away from the party line in the face of public outcry. As the September LegCo election approaches, the last thing Beijing wants is for the election to become a de facto referendum on the single issue of the national security law, which could result in another landslide win for the democratic parties. The law would be untenable to the international community if it’s opposed by both pro-democracy voters, which according to polls account for 60 percent of the votes, and moderate pro-establishment voters.

The moderates, despite their reluctance to embrace hardline rule in Hong Kong, differ from the more militant faction within the non-establishment camp in that the former rejects the so-called “mutual destruction” option, which risks Hong Kong’s special trade status — its economic lifeline — as a bargaining tactic to force Beijing to back off. Now that Washington is considering withdrawing Hong Kong’s privileges, the possibility of mutual destruction is becoming real. As Beijing has been promoting a narrative that all supporters of the protest movement’s “Five Demands” are bringing about mutual destruction, Beijing hopes the moderates, in fear of losing their financial assets, might turn toward the establishment.

On the other hand, the pro-democracy camp is at risk of breaking apart. Moderate pro-democracy supporters have been going to rallies to keep up with the political momentum. However, marches with more than a million participants would be impossible under the current oppressive environment. For example, the authorities abuse COVID-19 social distancing measures to suppress rallies, permits for peaceful protests are increasingly difficult to obtain, pro-establishment businesses heavily censored the social media activities of employees, and outspoken individuals are often cyberbullied.

Without support from the moderates, some within the pro-democracy camp may radicalize, as Beijing expects. The radicalization would fit Beijing’s tactic of painting protests as separatism and terrorism, justifying the imposition of the national security law. The trajectory would be similar to Beijing’s handling of the 1959 Tibetan “riots,” during which Mao Zedong’s directive was “the more chaotic the scene, the better.”

The Nationalistic Agenda to Divert Domestic Attention

But after all, to Beijing, Hong Kong is not just Hong Kong. In the wake of the pandemic, Beijing urgently needs to uphold nationalism to divert unwanted attention from its economic crisis. That includes a global propaganda campaign to promote its triumph over COVID-19. Upgrading the Hong Kong protests to a national security issue — as a battle against foreign interference to complete the “reunification with Hong Kong” — best suits the nationalist atmosphere. The all-time low sense of belonging with China among the new generation in Hong Kong further justifies a strong-arm approach. The success of the strategy would offer a way to reunite with Taiwan, which would consolidate Xi’s leadership within the Communist Party.

Also, including the Hong Kong issue as part of the national agenda means that the Hong Kong government, which has already lost its will to govern, will dance to Beijing’s tunes.

This comprehensive crackdown on Hong Kong’s civil society is unprecedented. Beijing believes that the heavy-handed approach would pervade Hong Kong with a sense of powerlessness and bring it to its knees. As long as the international response is limited, the execution of the national security law, according to Chairman Mao’s “theory of contradiction,” will follow a script of “a soft hand” and “a firm hand.” That is, after its imposition, the law will initially apply restraint and be used only on individuals to set a stern example, so that the general public would feel as if the law does not impact them at all and property and stock prices would not fall. Gradually and subtly, if the realist formula of Beijing works, the “second reunification” could become a self-proclaimed success story for Beijing’s propaganda.

However, Beijing’s evaluations are not foolproof. Any single miscalculation could lead to a contradictory outcome for the People’s Republic of China. Is it really prepared?

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【 黎安友專文 l 中國如何看待香港危機 】

美國哥倫比亞大學的資深中國通黎安友（Andrew Nathan）教授最近在《外交事務》（Foreign Affairs）雜誌的專文，值得一看。

黎安友是台灣許多中國研究學者的前輩級老師，小英總統去哥大演講時，正是他積極促成。小英在美國的僑宴，黎安友也是座上賓。

這篇文章的標題是：「中國如何看待香港危機：北京自我克制背後的真正原因」。

文章很長，而且用英文寫，需要花點時間閱讀。大家有空可以看看。

Andrew這篇文章的立論基礎，是來自北京核心圈的匿名說法。以他在學術界的地位，我相信他對消息來源已經做了足夠的事實查核或確認。

這篇文章，是在回答一個疑問：中共為何在香港事件如此自制？有人說是怕西方譴責，有人說是怕損害香港的金融地位。

都不是。這篇文章認為，上述兩者都不是中共的真實顧慮。

無論你多痛恨中共，你都必須真實面對你的敵人。

中共是搞經濟階級鬥爭起家的，當年用階級鬥爭打敗國民黨。而現在，中共正用這樣的思維處理香港議題。

文章有一句話：“China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence.” 這句話道盡階級鬥爭的精髓。

中共一點都不焦慮。相反地，中共很有自信，香港的菁英階級及既得利益的收編群體，到最後會支持中共。

這個分化的心理基礎，來自經濟上的利益。

文中還提到，鄧小平當年給香港五十年的一國兩制，就是為了「給香港足夠的時間適應中共的政治系統」。

1997年，香港的GDP佔中國的18%。2018年，這個比例降到2.8%。

今日的香港經濟，在中共的評估，是香港需要中國，而不是中國需要香港。

中共正在在意的，是香港的高房價問題。香港的房價，在過去十年內三倍翻漲。

文章是這樣描述：
“Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.”

無論你同不同意這些說法，都請你試圖客觀地看看這篇文章。

有趣的是，黎安友在文章中部分論點引述了他的消息來源（但他並沒有加上個人評論），部分是他自己的觀察。

#護台胖犬劉仕傑
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新書：《 我在外交部工作 》

**

黎安友原文：

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis?fbclid=IwAR2PwHns5gWrw0fT0sa5LuO8zgv4PhLmkYfegtBgoOMCD3WJFI3w5NTe0S4

How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis
The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint

By Andrew J. Nathan September 30, 2019

Massive and sometimes violent protests have rocked Hong Kong for over 100 days. Demonstrators have put forward five demands, of which the most radical is a call for free, direct elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and all members of the territory’s legislature: in other words, a fully democratic system of local rule, one not controlled by Beijing. As this brazen challenge to Chinese sovereignty has played out, Beijing has made a show of amassing paramilitary forces just across the border in Shenzhen. So far, however, China has not deployed force to quell the unrest and top Chinese leaders have refrained from making public threats to do so.

Western observers who remember the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago have been puzzled by Beijing’s forbearance. Some have attributed Beijing’s restraint to a fear of Western condemnation if China uses force. Others have pointed to Beijing’s concern that a crackdown would damage Hong Kong’s role as a financial center for China.

But according to two Chinese scholars who have connections to regime insiders and who requested anonymity to discuss the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence. Beijing is convinced that Hong Kong’s elites and a substantial part of the public do not support the demonstrators and that what truly ails the territory are economic problems rather than political ones—in particular, a combination of stagnant incomes and rising rents. Beijing also believes that, despite the appearance of disorder, its grip on Hong Kong society remains firm. The Chinese Communist Party has long cultivated the territory’s business elites (the so-called tycoons) by offering them favorable economic access to the mainland. The party also maintains a long-standing loyal cadre of underground members in the territory. And China has forged ties with the Hong Kong labor movement and some sections of its criminal underground. Finally, Beijing believes that many ordinary citizens are fearful of change and tired of the disruption caused by the demonstrations.

Beijing therefore thinks that its local allies will stand firm and that the demonstrations will gradually lose public support and eventually die out. As the demonstrations shrink, some frustrated activists will engage in further violence, and that in turn will accelerate the movement’s decline. Meanwhile, Beijing is turning its attention to economic development projects that it believes will address some of the underlying grievances that led many people to take to the streets in the first place.

This view of the situation is held by those at the very top of the regime in Beijing, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping, some of which have not been previously reported. In a speech Xi delivered in early September to a new class of rising political stars at the Central Party School in Beijing, he rejected the suggestion of some officials that China should declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong and send in the People’s Liberation Army. “That would be going down a political road of no return,” Xi said. “The central government will exercise the most patience and restraint and allow the [regional government] and the local police force to resolve the crisis.” In separate remarks that Xi made around the same time, he spelled out what he sees as the proper way to proceed: “Economic development is the only golden key to resolving all sorts of problems facing Hong Kong today.”

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, MANY QUESTIONS

Chinese decision-makers are hardly surprised that Hong Kong is chafing under their rule. Beijing believes it has treated Hong Kong with a light hand and has supported the territory’s economy in many ways, especially by granting it special access to the mainland’s stocks and currency markets, exempting it from the taxes and fees that other Chinese provinces and municipalities pay the central government, and guaranteeing a reliable supply of water, electricity, gas, and food. Even so, Beijing considers disaffection among Hong Kong’s residents a natural outgrowth of the territory’s colonial British past and also a result of the continuing influence of Western values. Indeed, during the 1984 negotiations between China and the United Kingdom over Hong Kong’s future, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested following the approach of “one country, two systems” for 50 years precisely to give people in Hong Kong plenty of time to get used to the Chinese political system.

But “one country, two systems” was never intended to result in Hong Kong spinning out of China’s control. Under the Basic Law that China crafted as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” Beijing retained the right to prevent any challenge to what it considered its core security interests. The law empowered Beijing to determine if and when Hong Kongers could directly elect the territory’s leadership, allowed Beijing to veto laws passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and granted China the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law. And there would be no question about who had a monopoly of force. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Deng publicly rebuked a top Chinese defense official—General Geng Biao, who at the time was a patron of a rising young official named Xi Jinping—for suggesting that there might not be any need to put troops in Hong Kong. Deng insisted that a Chinese garrison was necessary to symbolize Chinese sovereignty.

Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong.

At first, Hong Kongers seemed to accept their new role as citizens of a rising China. In 1997, in a tracking poll of Hong Kong residents regularly conducted by researchers at the University of Hong Kong, 47 percent of respondents identified themselves as “proud” citizens of China. But things went downhill from there. In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce “patriotic education” in elementary and middle schools, but the proposed curriculum ran into a storm of local opposition and had to be withdrawn. In 2014, the 79-day Umbrella Movement brought hundreds of thousands of citizens into the streets to protest Beijing’s refusal to allow direct elections for the chief executive. And as authoritarianism has intensified under Xi’s rule, events such as the 2015 kidnapping of five Hong Kong–based publishers to stand trial in the mainland further soured Hong Kong opinion. By this past June, only 27 percent of respondents to the tracking poll described themselves as “proud” to be citizens of China. This year’s demonstrations started as a protest against a proposed law that would have allowed Hong Kongers suspected of criminal wrongdoing to be extradited to the mainland but then developed into a broad-based expression of discontent over the lack of democratic accountability, police brutality, and, most fundamentally, what was perceived as a mainland assault on Hong Kong’s unique identity.

Still, Chinese leaders do not blame themselves for these shifts in public opinion. Rather, they believe that Western powers, especially the United States, have sought to drive a wedge between Hong Kong and the mainland. Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong. As Xi explained in his speech in September:
As extreme elements in Hong Kong turn more and more violent, Western forces, especially the United States, have been increasingly open in their involvement. Some extreme anti-China forces in the United States are trying to turn Hong Kong into the battleground for U.S.-Chinese rivalry…. They want to turn Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy into de facto independence, with the ultimate objective to contain China's rise and prevent the revival of the great Chinese nation.

Chinese leaders do not fear that a crackdown on Hong Kong would inspire Western antagonism. Rather, they take such antagonism as a preexisting reality—one that goes a long way toward explaining why the disorder in Hong Kong broke out in the first place. In Beijing’s eyes, Western hostility is rooted in the mere fact of China’s rise, and thus there is no use in tailoring China’s Hong Kong strategy to influence how Western powers would respond.

IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BENJAMINS

The view that Xi has not deployed troops because of Hong Kong’s economic importance to the mainland is also misguided, and relies on an outdated view of the balance of economic power. In 1997, Hong Kong’s GDP was equivalent to 18 percent of the mainland’s. Most of China’s foreign trade was conducted through Hong Kong, providing China with badly needed hard currencies. Chinese companies raised most of their capital on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Today, things are vastly different. In 2018, Hong Kong’s GDP was equal to only 2.7 percent of the mainland’s. Shenzhen alone has overtaken Hong Kong in terms of GDP. Less than 12 percent of China’s exports now flow through Hong Kong. The combined market value of China’s domestic stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen far surpasses that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chinese companies can also list in Frankfurt, London, New York, and elsewhere.

Although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Investment flowing into and out of China still tends to pass through financial holding vehicles set up in Hong Kong, in order to benefit from the region’s legal protections. But China’s new foreign investment law (which will take effect on January 1, 2020) and other recent policy changes mean that such investment will soon be able to bypass Hong Kong. And although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.

Wrecking Hong Kong’s economy by using military force to impose emergency rule would not be a good thing for China. But the negative effect on the mainland’s prosperity would not be strong enough to prevent Beijing from doing whatever it believes is necessary to maintain control over the territory.

CAN’T BUY ME LOVE?

As it waits out the current crisis, Beijing has already started tackling the economic problems that it believes are the source of much of the anger among Hong Kongers. Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.

Who is General Tso?? Beats me but when I was in the U.S., his style of sweet & sour chicken was widely available everywhere. I kinda miss it so asked Roland to cook this at home.

Refer to the ingredient list below or go to our website at http://spicenpans.com/general-tso-sweet-sour-chicken/ for your easy reference.

Hope you can recreate this yummy dish in the comfort of your home. Thanks for dropping by our channel.

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Ingredients:
Serves 4

Marinate ingredients
-------
Egg white from one egg - beaten until foaming
2 tablespoons of oyster sauce
1 tablespoon of rice wine
2 tablespoons of light soya sauce
1/2 teaspoon of baking soda
2 pieces of chicken thigh (cut into bite size) - about 400g in all
2 tablespoons of cornstarch (cornflour)

Gravy ingredients
-------
1 cup of chicken stock
2 tablespoons of light soya sauce
2 tablespoons of Chinese cooking wine
2 tablespoons of white vinegar
2 tablespoons of dark soya sauce
1 teaspoon of sesame oil
1 tablespoon of sugar
1 tablespoon of cornflour

Ingredients for chicken coating
-------
4 tablespoons of cornflour
4 tablespoons of all-purpose flour
1 teaspoon of baking soda
1 teaspoon of salt

Other ingredients
-------
3 cloves of chopped garlic
1 thumb size grated ginger
10 pieces of dried chilli - rehydrated and deseeded
1 red onion - sliced
1/2 teaspoon of salt

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