關於 u.s. population history ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

最近，我在「TIME時代」雜志的專欄文章裡，向全球的讀者介紹了大陸「世界工廠」的+AI自動化升級。隨著勞動力成本的上漲，工業自動化、智慧化勢必是大陸製造業的一劑特效藥。自動化能讓運營成本下降，但仍能讓中國大陸保持生產品質、流程、供應鏈維度的優勢。AI賦能產業升級的願景或許還需多年才能實現，但當下的大陸已經讓未來可期。

以下是專欄文章全文，經TIME授權翻譯轉載：

「中國世界工廠 + AI 的未來」

多年來，中國大陸一直被喻為「世界工廠」，即便在全球其他經濟體紛紛遭遇新冠疫情重擊的2020年，大陸製造產業仍然維持穩健的增長范式，全年產值高達3.854萬億美元，占到全球市場近三分之一。

但如果你腦中的大陸工廠是傳統的「血汗工廠」，是時候修正你的刻板印象了。大陸經濟已經迅速地從疫情衝擊下復蘇，疫情同時催化了各種各樣人工智慧（AI）的應用場景加速實現。自2014年以來，中國大陸的AI專利申請量已經超越美國，至今維持全球領先。在學術領域，中國大陸的AI研究論文發表數量、AI期刊的引用量，也雙雙在近年超過了美國。在產業方面，AI應用在大陸的落地速度超越世界其他國家和地區，具有商業價值的AI應用如今開始百花齊放，整合了軟體、硬體和機器人技術的新一代自動化揭開序曲，AI賦能傳統行業的能量，正在蓄勢待發地重塑各行各業。

人類社會至今經歷了三次不同的工業革命：蒸汽革命、電力革命和資訊革命。我相信，AI將會是推動全球第四次工業革命的核心引擎，在世界各地點燃數位化和自動化的變革，而這波前所未有的硬科技浪潮，將由中國來引領實踐。

由於勞動人口減少和新增人口放緩，中國大陸的傳統產業正面臨著勞動力成本上升的巨大壓力，AI正是解決這個難題的技術解答。人工智慧不僅能夠降低運營成本，提高生產效率，擴大整體產能，還有望能帶來收入的增長。

例如，創新工場投資的廣州極飛科技是一家致力於未來農業的AI科技公司，極飛將無人機、機器人和感測器部署在稻田、麥田和棉花田裡，用技術賦能農業中的播種、農藥噴灑、栽種管理、甚至天氣監測環節。用於作物噴灑的極飛科技R150農業無人車已經被推廣到了英國，應用在蘋果、草莓、黑莓等多種經濟作物的種植流程中。

一些大陸的創新公司正積極把機器人拓展到意想不到的場景。總部位於北京的鎂伽是創新工場投資的生命科學智慧自動化公司，他們和實驗室、製藥公司、高校合作，憑藉AI+機器人技術的積累，用自動化解決方案執行實驗室中勞動密集、重複性高、但需要高度精確的任務和流程，同時機器人作業也將盡最大可能保護實驗室人員降低實驗過程中的感染風險。

除了創業公司，我們看到幾家成熟的龍頭企業也開始積極擁抱AI。創新工場參與了有28年歷史的中力電動叉車，這家頭部的鋰電叉車製造商已經推出了能夠在工廠、倉庫自主運行的無人叉車，並且無需對運行環境進行改造，能快速實現從手動到電動到自動駕駛的搬運賦能創新。此外，擁有50多年歷史的領先客車製造商-宇通集團，與自動駕駛獨角獸企業-文遠知行戰略合作，已在大陸三個城市的馬路上運行全無人駕駛小巴。

接著會發生什麼？我大膽預見，在更長遠的未來，機器人和AI將接管大多數產品的製造、設計、交付甚至營銷——很可能將生產成本降低到和原物料成本相差無幾。未來的機器人有能力自我複製和自我修復，甚至做到部分自我反覆運算設計。房屋和公寓將交由AI主導設計，使用預製建築模塊，交由機器人像搭積木似地築樓蓋房。無人公交、無人摩托等隨傳隨到的自動化未來交通系統，能將我們安全無虞地送達想去的地方。

這些願景成為現實或許還需要多年，但此時的大陸正在積極鋪墊引領新一代自動化革命的基石。可期的是，中國工廠的實力將不僅僅體現在產能上，而將逐步彰顯在智慧上。

本文經「TIME時代」授權進行中文編譯，原文如下：

China Is Still the World's Factory — And It's Designing the Future With AI

BY KAI-FU LEE

For many years now, China has been the world’s factory. Even in 2020, as other economies struggled with the effects of the pandemic, China’s manufacturing output was $3.854 trillion, up from the previous year, accounting for nearly a third of the global market.

But if you are still thinking of China’s factories as sweatshops, it’s probably time to change your perception. The Chinese economic recovery from its short-lived pandemic blip has been boosted by its world-beating adoption of artificial intelligence (AI). After overtaking the U.S. in 2014, China now has a significant lead over the rest of the world in AI patent applications. In academia, China recently surpassed the U.S. in the number of both AI research publications and journal citations. Commercial applications are flourishing: a new wave of automation and AI infusion is crashing across a swath of sectors, combining software, hardware and robotics.

As a society, we have experienced three distinct industrial revolutions: steam power, electricity and information technology. I believe AI is the engine fueling the fourth industrial revolution globally, digitizing and automating everywhere. China is at the forefront in manifesting this unprecedented change.

Chinese traditional industries are confronting rising labor costs thanks to a declining working population and slowing population growth. The answer is AI, which reduces operational costs, enhances efficiency and productivity, and generates revenue growth.

For example, Guangzhou-based agricultural-technology company XAG, a Sinovation Ventures portfolio company, is sending drones, robots and sensors to rice, wheat and cotton fields, automating seeding, pesticide spraying, crop development and weather monitoring. XAG’s R150 autonomous vehicle, which sprays crops, has recently been deployed in the U.K. to be used on apples, strawberries and blackberries.

Some companies are rolling out robots in new and unexpected sectors. MegaRobo, a Beijing-based life-science automation company also backed by Sinovation Ventures, designs AI and robots to safely perform repetitive and precise laboratory work in universities, pharmaceutical companies and more, reducing to zero the infection risk to lab workers.

It’s not just startups; established market leaders are also leaning into AI. EP Equipment, a manufacturer of lithium-powered warehouse forklifts founded in Hangzhou 28 years ago, has with Sinovation Ventures’ backing launched autonomous models that are able to maneuver themselves in factories and on warehouse floors. Additionally Yutong Group, a leading bus manufacturer with over 50 years’ history, already has a driverless Mini Robobus on the streets of three cities in partnership with autonomous vehicle unicorn WeRide.

Where is all this headed? I can foresee a time when robots and AI will take over the manufacturing, design, delivery and even marketing of most goods—potentially reducing costs to a small increment over the cost of materials. Robots will become self-replicating, self-repairing and even partially self-designing. Houses and apartment buildings will be designed by AI and use prefabricated modules that robots put together like toy blocks. And just-in-time autonomous public transportation, from robo-buses to robo-scooters, will take us anywhere we want to go.

It will be years before these visions of the future enter the mainstream. But China is laying the groundwork right now, setting itself up to be a leader not only in how much it manufactures, but also in how intelligently it does it.

Source：https://time.com/6084158/china-ai-factory-future/

The History of Vietnamese Traditional Culinary (Phở). 🇻🇳

Pho is a Vietnamese soup consisting of broth, rice noodles (bánh phở), herbs, and meat (usually beef) (phở bò), sometimes chicken (phở gà). Pho is a popular food in Vietnam where it is served in households, street stalls and restaurants countrywide. Pho is considered Vietnam's national dish.

Pho originated in the early 20th century in northern Vietnam, and was popularized throughout the world by refugees after the Vietnam War. Because Pho's origins are poorly documented, there is disagreement over the cultural influences that led to its development in Vietnam, as well as the etymology of the name. The Hanoi (northern) and Saigon (southern) styles of pho differ by noodle width, sweetness of broth, and choice of herbs.

Pho likely evolved from similar noodle dishes. For example, villagers in Vân Cù say they ate pho long before the French colonial period. The modern form emerged between 1900 and 1907 in northern Vietnam, southeast of Hanoi in Nam Định Province, then a substantial textile market. The traditional home of pho is reputed to be the villages of Vân Cù and Dao Cù (or Giao Cù) in Đông Xuân commune, Nam Trực District, Nam Định Province.

Cultural historian and researcher Trịnh Quang Dũng believes that the popularization and origins of modern pho stemmed from the intersection of several historical and cultural factors in the early 20th century. These include improved availability of beef due to French demand, which in turn produced beef bones that were purchased by Chinese workers to make into a dish similar to pho called ngưu nhục phấn. The demand for this dish was initially the greatest with workers from the provinces of Yunnan and Guangdong, who had an affinity for the dish due to its similarities to that of their homeland, which eventually popularized and familiarized this dish with the general population.

Pho was originally sold at dawn and dusk by itinerant street vendors, who shouldered mobile kitchens on carrying poles (gánh phở). From the pole hung two wooden cabinets, one housing a cauldron over a wood fire, the other storing noodles, spices, cookware, and space to prepare a bowl of pho. The heavy gánh was always shouldered by men. They kept their heads warm with distinctive, disheveled felt hats called mũ phở.

Hanoi's first two fixed pho stands were a Vietnamese-owned Cát Tường on Cầu Gỗ Street and a Chinese-owned stand in front of Bờ Hồ tram stop. They were joined in 1918 by two more on Quạt Row and Đồng Row. Around 1925, a Vân Cù villager named Vạn opened the first "Nam Định style" pho stand in Hanoi. Gánh phở declined in number around 1936–1946 in favor of stationary eateries.

In the late 1920s, various vendors experimented with húng lìu, sesame oil, tofu, and even Lethocerus indicus extract (cà cuống). This "phở cải lương" failed to enter the mainstream.

Phở tái, served with rare beef, had been introduced by 1930. Chicken pho appeared in 1939, possibly because beef was not sold at the markets on Mondays and Fridays at the time.

With the partition of Vietnam in 1954, over a million people fled North Vietnam for South Vietnam. Pho, previously unpopular in the South, suddenly became popular. No longer confined to northern culinary traditions, variations in meat and broth appeared, and additional garnishes, such as lime, mung bean sprouts (giá đỗ), culantro (ngò gai), cinnamon basil (húng quế), Hoisin sauce (tương đen), and hot chili sauce (tương ớt) became standard fare. Phở tái also began to rival fully cooked phở chín in popularity. Migrants from the North similarly popularized bánh mì sandwiches.

Meanwhile, in North Vietnam, private pho restaurants were nationalized (mậu dịch quốc doanh) and began serving pho noodles made from old rice. Street vendors were forced to use noodles made of imported potato flour. Officially banned as capitalism, these vendors prized portability, carrying their wares on gánh and setting out plastic stools for customers.

During the so-called "subsidy period" following the Vietnam War, state-owned pho eateries served a meatless variety of the dish known as "pilotless pho" (phở không người lái), in reference to the U.S. Air Force's unmanned reconnaissance drones. The broth consisted of boiled water with MSG added for taste, as there were often shortages on various foodstuffs like meat and rice during that period. Bread or cold rice was often served as a side dish, leading to the present-day practice of dipping quẩy in pho.

Pho eateries were privatized as part of Đổi Mới. Many street vendors must still maintain a light footprint to evade police enforcing the street tidiness rules that replaced the ban on private ownership.

________________
Admin_MZA
©️ Respective Owner(s)

Is a U.S.-China hot war imminent?｜Lee Yee

In July, Pompeo claimed the American policy towards China is harsher than the one towards the Soviet Union in the Cold War era. The approach has been shifted from “listening to its words and watching its deeds” to “ignoring its words and only watching its deeds”. Recent developments show that the U.S. is striding closer and closer to a complete de-linkage with China. The recall of the ambassador from China was just a prelude. What followed was the U.S. official interpretation that “one China policy” is not equivalent to “one China principle”, plus the emphasis that “the U.S. holds no specific standpoint towards the sovereignty of Taiwan”. Furthermore, during the visit of Krach, U.S. Under Secretary of State, Tsai Ing-wen stated that “Taiwan has the determination to take the critical step”. Adding fuel to this, Hsiao Bi Khim, Taiwan’s delegate at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the U.S., introduced herself as the “Taiwan Ambassador to the U.S.” on Twitter. In view of all these, is the U.S. going to establish diplomatic relation with Taiwan? Will it turn out to be the “October surprise” before the U.S. presidential election? In response, China dispatched fighter jets to violate the airspace of Taiwan, and as “Global Times” put it, “this was not a gesture of warning, but an actual combat exercise of attacking Taiwan”. In return, Taiwan authority urged China “not to underestimate its armed forces' resolve in safeguarding Taiwan”. As tension keeps building up across the Strait, will the U.S. intervene and finally trigger a U.S.-China hot war?

For the last few months, while analyzing the situation, quite a few observers have drawn upon the “Thucydides trap” originated from an ancient Greek historian. According to this theory, when an emerging power threatens to displace an existing great power as an international hegemony, there will be an unavoidable tendency towards war.

To be frank, these observers may have well overestimated the strength of China. Thanks to its huge population, China has become the second largest economic entity in the world. But we are now living in an era that national strength is rather defined by technological advancement. In reality, China is militarily inferior to Russia and technologically lagging far behind major western countries. To put it simply, China is yet to be capable of challenging the American dominance.

Back in the 1980s, in the heyday of its economic development, Japan has significantly outperformed the U.S. in the capital market, and some American scholars have come to the “Japan No.1” conclusion. Despite this, there was never a sign of military confrontation between U.S. and Japan. A decade later, the formation of the European Union posed new challenge to the American supremacy. But again, the two did not come anywhere close to a war. So why has the emergence of China, which in fact lacks the capabilities to overwhelm the U.S., aroused much anticipation of war?

Rudolph Rummel, an American professor of political studies, have made a thorough analysis on the correlation between wars and democracy in human history. After humans surviving a thousand years of darkness, it was not until the independence of the U.S. in 1776 that unveiled a democratic institution with public elections, separation of powers, multi-party system as well as freedom of speech, press, religion and assembly. After more than a hundred years, in 1900 there were only 13 democratic countries in the world. And after another decade, in 2015 the rose to 130, and dictatorial states without meaningful elections have become the minority.

According to Rummel’s statistics, there were 371 wars between 1816 and 2005. Among them, 205 were fought between two dictatorial countries and 166 between democratic and dictatorial ones. Interestingly, there had not been a single war between democratic countries. The conclusion is all too obvious: if there were only democratic states on earth, wars would not happen.

And here lies the fundamental reason why the “Thucydides Trap” has been more valid in the old days when dictatorial systems prevailed, but has failed to apply in contemporary cases between two democratic countries. And it also explains why the competitions between the U.S. and Japan or the EU have not led to any war, while the challenge from China will probably end up differently.

In a democratic system, to wage a war requires a consensus among the government, legislature, media and public opinion. It is rather a matter of the people’s collective will than the ruler’s subjective decision. Whereas within a dictatorial structure, no approval from the legislature is needed, media and public opinion are never respected and judicial challenge simply does not exist. A dictator or oligarch can just go to war at will.

From a dictator’s point of view, whether to enter a war or not is not subject to external circumstance, but the domestic status of his ruling. When a dictator’s position gets shaken by severe economic downturn and widespread public discontent, he will try to divert domestic dissatisfaction by means of foreign maneuvers. The dictator tends to single out those “non-conforming groups”, as so identified by the “little pink” Chinese patriots, and tries bullying them, as what the CCP is doing in India, Hong Kong and Inner Mongolia. The objective is to distract attention with extreme nationalism. More often than not, stirring up external instability has become a tactic to secure domestic stability of the dictator’s rule.

Perhaps a shrewd dictator will weigh up the strength of his counterpart before taking action. Nevertheless, the intrinsically defective system may hinder the dictator from understanding the reality and accessing different views. And personal intellectual and intelligent inadequacies may also breed unrealistic self-inflating belief. The resulted stupidity can make a tragedy more imminent than everyone may expect.