關於 us supreme court covid ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

0703紐約時報

*【美軍撤離阿富汗基地，等於結束在當地的軍事行動】
美國軍隊及其西方盟友離開阿富汗的美國軍事基地，結束了近二十年來，在阿富汗的主要軍事行動。對於幾代美國軍人來說，巴格拉姆空軍基地是重要的戰場和駐軍行動基地。在撤軍的最後一日，沒有大張旗鼓，也沒有公開儀式，令人嚴重關切的是，阿富汗安全部隊能否阻止塔利班在全國推進。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/world/asia/afghanistan-bagram-us-withdrawal.html

*【拜登就阿富汗問題發出的訊息】
美國政府試圖讓美國人放心，他表示政府正在結束“永遠的戰爭”，但也同時向阿富汗人發出信號，美國不會放棄這個四面楚歌的國家，美國軍方將透過遠程通訊幫助阿富汗軍隊，拜登政府仍計劃向阿富汗政府提供超過30億美元的安全援助，只是在該國根本無法監督並防止腐敗。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/us/politics/biden-afghanistan.html

*【拜登宣佈“從病毒解脫”是否為時過早？】
儘管在七月四日只達到70%成年人接種疫苗的目標，但拜登政府已開始計畫在7月4日舉行“美國重歸於好”的慶祝活動。總統和第一夫人吉爾拜登已邀請 1,000 名軍事人員和重要工作人員，參加在白宮南草坪舉行的獨立日慶祝活動。白宮官員沒有說明，參加活動之前是否會要求客人提供疫苗接種或檢測證明，但一位官員表示將很快公佈協議和更多細節。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/us/politics/biden-coronavirus.html

*【Covid-19實時更新】
#隨著病例的增加，密蘇里州向向白宮請求成立一個“緊急響應小組”。密蘇里州的官員，在接種率相對較低，且Delta變種傳播比其他州更普遍的情況下，向白宮尋求協助，以應對冠狀病毒病例和死亡人數的激增。
#食品和藥物管理署清理了一大批嬌生，先前疫苗工廠Emergent BioSolutions 製造污染的疫苗。
#雖然Delta變異病毒成為目前傳播主要病毒，但紐約市的案件量仍然較低且穩定。
#為了提供針對 Delta 變體的有效覆蓋範圍，德國衛生當局要求接受第一針阿斯特捷利康AZ疫苗的人，接種輝瑞 BioNTech 或 Moderna 疫苗為第二劑。
#葡萄牙正在里斯本、波爾圖和其他受歡迎的旅遊景點實施從晚上 11 點到淩晨 5 點的宵禁，以對抗Delta激增
#法國警告說，Delta變種現在占所有新病例的三分之一。法國衛生部長Olivier Véran表示，雖然病毒得到控制，但新病例的下降速度已經放緩，這種變異是一種“真正的威脅”，可能會“毀掉”暑假。
#美國軍隊和退伍軍人醫院努力提高疫苗接種率。
#Delta 變體可能會結束澳洲對“Covid Zero”的追求。
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/07/02/world/covid-19-vaccine-coronavirus-updates

*【六月的就業報告為華盛頓帶來了好消息和重大問題】
勞工部的報告，六月份增加850,000個工作機會，這個強勁的數字受到工資上漲的支撐，雇主積極招聘以滿足增長的商業需求。該報告為拜登政府和美聯準會提供了令人鼓舞的要點，表明經濟正在朝著央行的充分就業目標邁進。但停滯的勞動力市場，參與凸顯了一個關鍵風險。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/business/economy/jobs-economy-covid.html

*【保守派乃占最高法院多數】
首席大法官的權力減弱，三位川普任命的大法官影響力也越來越大。這一任期以感嘆號結束，法院對《投票權法》實施了新的限制。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/us/supreme-court-conservative-voting-rights.html

*【出於安全考慮，北邁阿密海灘的一座公寓大樓要求民眾疏散】
北邁阿密海灘一座10層公寓大樓被勒令關閉並疏散其居民，此前該建築提交了一份基於1月份檢查的認證報告，該報告記錄了“不安全的結構和電氣狀況”。這座擁有156個單元的建築Crestview Towers，建於1972年，距離Surfside倒塌現場約7英里車程。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/us/north-miami-beach-condo-evacuated.html

*【Miami-Dad市長下令拆除剩餘Surfside公寓】
這是在擔心受損結構，可能再次倒塌，並破壞救援工作後所做出的決定。自從公寓大樓倒塌一個多星期以來，搜索工作進展緩慢，瓦礫區域被認為對救援人員來說太危險了。最新進展是又發現了四具屍體，死亡人數達到22人，仍有多達126 人仍然下落不明，由於颶風艾爾莎正在逼近，也加大了搜救的風險。
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/07/02/us/condo-building-collapse-miami-updates

0618紐約時報

*【共和黨人再度挑戰歐巴馬醫保法案，遭最高法院駁回】
平價醫療法案是歐巴馬任內留下的決定性遺產，但一直遭到共和黨人敵視。這是後者第三次對其發起重大挑戰，最高法院再次維持了該法案的效力。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/upshot/obamacare-supreme-court-decision.html

*【民主黨人在就更狹窄的基礎設施談判中提出了6兆美元的計畫】
儘管兩黨就較小的基建法案繼續進行談判，但參議院民主黨人已經開始私下權衡一項龐大的經濟計畫，規模可能高達6兆美元，即使兩黨議員小組努力爭取支持一項更窄的基礎設施計畫，該計畫將投入5790億美元新資金用於資助實體公共工程項目。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/us/politics/democrats-infrastructure-deal-congress.html

*【拜登簽署法案，將“六月節”(Juneteenth)定為聯邦法定節日】
在眾議院以壓倒性多數投票決定將6月19日定為紀念美國結束奴隸制的國家節日後，拜登簽署法案，將這一天正式定為聯邦假日。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/us/politics/juneteenth-holiday-biden.html

*【Covid-19實時更新】
#密西根州長惠特默稱該州提前重新開放。她表示將從6月22日取消密西根州剩餘的大部分流行病限制，比計劃提前十天。她引用了該州穩定的疫苗接種率：50%的居民至少接種了一劑，以及新病例和住院人數的下降的標準，過去兩週下降了約 45%。
#美國駐喀布爾大使館因在阿富汗蔓延的冠狀病毒爆發而被封鎖。大使館在週四發布的管理通知中說：“軍隊醫院 ICU 資源已滿負荷運轉，迫使我們的衛生部門建立臨時的 Covid-19 複合病房來照顧依賴氧氣的患者。”
#奧運會前五週，東京的緊急狀態將得到緩解。日本首相菅義偉在政府冠狀病毒特別工作組會議上宣佈了這一消息，稱過去一個月新增感染人數有所下降，全國醫院的壓力也有所緩解。政府表示，週日，九個縣將解除緊急狀態，但東京和其他六個地區的一些限制措施將至少持續到 7 月 11 日。官員說，沖繩的緊急措施將再持續三週。
#冠狀病毒在密蘇里州的旅遊區激增。密蘇里州西南部的奧扎克地區的部分區域，Covid 住院人數在幾週內幾乎翻了一番。週三，該州衛生部門報告說，僅該州西南部地區就有 200 多人住院，而這個數字在上個月底剛剛超過 100 人。
#印度雄偉的泰姬陵本週重新向遊客敞開大門，這是地方政府廣泛放鬆限制的一部分，希望重振遭受重創的旅遊業。儘管該國仍處於已造成數十萬人死亡的毀滅性爆發之中，但開放經濟的舉措仍然存在。疫苗接種繼續緩慢進行，一些健康專家警告說，過快放鬆限制可能會產生致命的後果。
#各國紛紛祭出激勵措施，以提高疫苗接種率。冠狀病毒大流行暴露了全球經濟和社會的斷層線，但 Covid-19 疫苗使分歧更加明顯：雖然一些貧窮國家懇求疫苗來拯救他們的人民，但富裕國家卻充斥著疫苗，缺乏接種者.
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/06/17/world/covid-vaccine-coronavirus-mask

*【南亞疫苗緊缺，多國接種運動近乎停滯】
斯里蘭卡正在向日本尋求疫苗，尼泊爾向丹麥提出了採購要求。自印度因本國疫情惡化停止疫苗出口以來，該地區的疫苗接種活動一直沒有進展。包括G7在內的較富裕國家最近提出增加對發展中國家的疫苗捐贈，但衛生官員指出，這些承諾模糊而遙遠，無法解決當前的難題。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/world/south-asia-covid-vaccines.html

*【美國計畫投入32億美元研發口服藥物治療新冠】
美國衛生與公眾服務部宣佈這一新項目，表示將加快一些有希望的候選藥物的臨床試驗。如果順利，首批藥物有望在今年年底前面世。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/health/covid-pill-antiviral.html

*【神舟十二號太空人進入“天和”核心艙】
三名太空人將在太空進行為期三個月的在軌駐留，並出艙活動。這次發射使得中國的天宮號成為太空中兩個有人在軌的前哨基地之一。中央電視臺對週四的活動進行了現場直播，這也反映了該國高級官員對太空計畫日益增長的信心。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/world/asia/china-space.html

*【太空競爭新時代：中俄聯手對抗美國】
中俄正在統籌一系列月球任務，旨在建立永久性基地，還計畫在2024年進行小行星探測任務，拉開了新太空競爭時代的序幕。新合作夥伴關係也反映了當今世界的地緣政治。
https://cn.nytimes.com/world/20210617/china-russia-space/

*【潘石屹夫婦出售SOHO中國控股權，黑石集團以30.5億美元接盤】
潘石屹和張欣本周達成一項協議，將把中國房地產開發商SOHO中國的控股權移交給投資巨頭黑石。當前知名企業家在中國正受到前所未有的公眾和官方審查。與中國經濟復蘇的早期、更自由的時期相比，潘石屹和張欣夫婦近年來一直保持低調。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/business/soho-china-blackstone-sale.html

*【他曾警告蘋果在中國做生意將面臨什麼，如今預言成為現實】
Doug Guthrie是研究中國轉向資本主義的美國主要專家之一，蘋果曾在2014年雇傭他，以幫助開拓中國市場。自那時起，他就已經意識到，在習近平治下的中國，蘋果可能會有多脆弱。他曾多次發出警告，對中國供應鏈和市場的極度依賴將使這家公司對政府的要求幾乎沒有任何抗拒的籌碼，而這正是蘋果今天在中國處境的寫照。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/technology/apple-china-doug-guthrie.html

*【美聯邦機構提議對中國電信設備進行進一步限制】
美國聯邦傳播委員會一致投票決定，將著手研究禁止美國公司未來從華為和中興等公司購買電信設備的提案，以保護包括5G在內的國家網路安全。這表明拜登政府延續了川普政府的強硬立場，警惕中國利用科技公司展開監視行動。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/technology/fcc-china-technology-restrictions.html

*【金正恩稱已準備好與拜登進行“對話和對抗“】
據朝中社報導，金正恩週四在勞動黨會議上“詳細分析”了拜登政府的朝鮮政策，強調“需要做好對話和對抗準備，特別是萬無一失地做好對抗準備”。這是金正恩對於拜登政府朝核問題新政的首次公開回應。
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/18/world/asia/north-korea-kim-jong-un-biden.html

這是前些日子爆出已經被加拿大法院接理對藏傳佛教噶舉派法王的訟訴。（加拿大法院鏈接在此：https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/sc/21/09/2021BCSC0939cor1.htm?fbclid=IwAR2FLZlzmUIGTBaTuKPVchEqqngcE3Qy6G_C0TWNWVKa2ksbIYkVJVMQ8f8）

這位法王的桃色事件，我是幾年前才聽到。但，藏傳佛教的高層有這些性醜聞，我已經聽了幾十年。我以前的一位前女友也被一些堪布藉故上她的家摟抱過，也有一些活佛跟她表白。（這不只是她，其他地方我也聽過不少）

這是一個藏傳佛教裡面系統式的問題。

很多時候發生這種事情，信徒和教主往往都是說女方得不到寵而報仇，或者說她們也精神病，或者說她們撒謊。

我不排除有這種可能性，但，多過一位，甚至多位出來指證的時候，我是傾向於相信『沒有那麼巧這麼多有精神病的女人要撒謊來報仇』。

大寶法王的桃色事件，最先吹哨的是一位台灣的在家信徒，第二位是香港的女出家人，現在加拿大又多一位公開舉報上法庭。

對大寶法王信徒來說，這一次的比較麻煩，因為是有孩子的。（關於有孩子的，我早在法王的桃色事件曝光時，就有聽聞）

如果法庭勒令要驗證DNA，這對法王和他的信徒來說，會很尷尬和矛盾，因為做或不做，都死。

你若問我，我覺得『人數是有力量的』，同時我也覺得之後有更多的人站出來，是不出奇的。

我也藉此呼籲各方佛教徒，如果你們真的愛佛教，先別說批判，但如鴕鳥般不討論這些爭議，你是間接害了佛教。

（下面是我從加拿大法院鏈接拷貝下來的內容，當中有很多細節。）

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

ANALYSIS

A. The Spousal Support Claim in this Case

B. The Test to Amend Pleadings

C. Pleadings in Family Law Cases

D. The Legal Concept of a Marriage-Like Relationship

E. Is There a Reasonable Claim of a Marriage-Like Relationship?

F. Delay / Prejudice

CONCLUSION



INTRODUCTION
[1] The claimant applies to amend her notice of family claim to seek spousal support. At issue is whether the claimant’s allegations give rise to a reasonable claim she lived with the respondent in a marriage-like relationship, so as to give rise to a potential entitlement to spousal support under the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 (“FLA”).

[2] The facts alleged by the claimant do not fit within a traditional concept of marriage. The claimant does not allege that she and the respondent ever lived together. Indeed, she has only met the respondent in person four times: twice very briefly in a public setting; a third time in private, when she alleges the respondent sexually assaulted her; and a fourth and final occasion, when she informed the respondent she was pregnant with his child.

[3] The claimant’s case is that what began as a non-consensual sexual encounter evolved into a loving and affectionate relationship. That relationship occurred almost entirely over private text messages. The parties rarely spoke on the telephone, and never saw one another during the relationship, even over video. The claimant says they could not be together because the respondent is forbidden by his station and religious beliefs from intimate relationships or marriage. Nonetheless, she alleges, they formed a marriage-like relationship that lasted from January 2018 to January 2019.

[4] The respondent denies any romantic relationship with the claimant. While he acknowledges providing emotional and financial support to the claimant, he says it was for the benefit of the child the claimant told him was his daughter.

[5] The claimant’s proposed amendment raises a novel question: can a secret relationship that began on-line and never moved into the physical world be like a marriage? In my view, that question should be answered by a trial judge after hearing all of the evidence. The alleged facts give rise to a reasonable claim the claimant lived with the respondent in a marriage-like relationship. Accordingly, I grant the claimant leave to amend her notice of family claim.

BACKGROUND
[6] It should be emphasized that this is an application to amend pleadings only. The allegations by the claimant are presumed to be true for the purposes of this application. Those allegations have not been tested in a court of law.

[7] The respondent, Ogyen Trinley Dorje, is a high lama of the Karma Kagyu School of Tibetan Buddhism. He has been recognized and enthroned as His Holiness, the 17th Gyalwang Karmapa. Without meaning any disrespect, I will refer to him as Mr. Dorje in these reasons for judgment.

[8] Mr. Dorje leads a monastic and nomadic lifestyle. His true home is Tibet, but he currently resides in India. He receives followers from around the world at the Gyuto Monetary in India. He also travels the world teaching Tibetan Buddhist Dharma and hosting pujas, ceremonies at which Buddhists express their gratitude and devotion to the Buddha.

[9] The claimant, Vikki Hui Xin Han, is a former nun of Tibetan Buddhism. Ms. Han first encountered Mr. Dorje briefly at a large puja in 2014. The experience of the puja convinced Ms. Han she wanted to become a Buddhist nun. She met briefly with Mr. Dorje, in accordance with Kagyu traditions, to obtain his approval to become a nun.

[10] In October 2016, Ms. Han began a three-year, three-month meditation retreat at a monastery in New York State. Her objective was to learn the practices and teachings of the Kagyu Lineage. Mr. Dorje was present at the retreat twice during the time Ms. Han was at the monastery.

[11] Ms. Han alleges that on October 14, 2017, Mr. Dorje sexually assaulted her in her room at the monastery. She alleges that she became pregnant from the assault.

[12] After she learned that she was pregnant, Ms. Han requested a private audience with Mr. Dorje. In November 2017, in the presence of his bodyguards, Ms. Han informed Mr. Dorje she was pregnant with his child. Mr. Dorje initially denied responsibility; however, he provided Ms. Han with his email address and a cellphone number, and, according to Ms. Han, said he would “prepare some money” for her.

[13] Ms. Han abandoned her plan to become a nun, left the retreat and returned to Canada. She never saw Mr. Dorje again.

[14] After Ms. Han returned to Canada, she and Mr. Dorje began a regular communication over an instant messaging app called Line. They also exchanged emails and occasionally spoke on the telephone.

[15] The parties appear to have expressed care and affection for one another in these communications. I say “appear to” because it is difficult to fully understand the meaning and intentions of another person from brief text messages, especially those originally written in a different language. The parties wrote in a private shorthand, sharing jokes, emojis, cartoon portraits and “hugs” or “kisses”. Ms. Han was the more expressive of the two, writing more frequently and in longer messages. Mr. Dorje generally participated in response to questions or prompting from Ms. Han, sometimes in single word messages.

[16] Ms. Han deposes that she believed Mr. Dorje was in love with her and that, by January 2018, she and Mr. Dorje were living in a “conjugal relationship”.

[17] During their communications, Ms. Han expressed concern that her child would be “illegitimate”. She appears to have asked Mr. Dorje to marry her, and he appears to have responded that he was “not ready”.

[18] Throughout 2018, Mr. Dorje transferred funds in various denominations to Ms. Han through various third parties. Ms. Han deposes that these funds were:

a) $50,000 CDN to deliver the child and for postpartum care she was to receive at a facility in Seattle;

b) $300,000 CDN for the first year of the child’s life;

c) $20,000 USD for a wedding ring, because Ms. Han wrote “Even if we cannot get married, you must buy me a wedding ring”;

d) $400,000 USD to purchase a home for the mother and child.

[19] On June 19, 2018, Ms. Han gave birth to a daughter in Richmond, B.C.

[20] On September 17, 2018, Mr. Dorje wrote, ”Taking care of her and you are my duty for life”.

[21] Ms. Han’s expectation was that the parties would live together in the future. She says they planned to live together. Those plans evolved over time. Initially they involved purchasing a property in Toronto, so that Mr. Dorje could visit when he was in New York. They also discussed purchasing property in Calgary or renting a home in Vancouver for that purpose. Ms. Han eventually purchased a condominium in Richmond using funds provided by Mr. Dorje.

[22] Ms. Han deposes that the parties made plans for Mr. Dorje to visit her and meet the child in Richmond. In October 2018, however, Mr. Dorje wrote that he needed to “disappear” to Europe. He wrote:

I will definitely find a way to meet her

And you

Remember to take care of yourself if something happens

[23] The final plan the parties discussed, according to Ms. Han, was that Mr. Dorje would sponsor Ms. Han and the child to immigrate to the United States and live at the Kagyu retreat centre in New York State.

[24] In January 2019, Ms. Han lost contact with Mr. Dorje.

[25] Ms. Han commenced this family law case on July 17, 2019, seeking child support, a declaration of parentage and a parentage test. She did not seek spousal support.

[26] Ms. Han first proposed a claim for spousal support in October 2020 after a change in her counsel. Following an exchange of correspondence concerning an application for leave to amend the notice of family claim, Ms. Han’s counsel wrote that Ms. Han would not be advancing a spousal support claim. On March 16, 2020, counsel reversed course, and advised that Ms. Han had instructed him to proceed with the application.

[27] When this application came on before me, the trial was set to commence on June 7, 2021. The parties were still in the process of discoveries and obtaining translations for hundreds of pages of documents in Chinese characters.

[28] At a trial management conference on May 6, 2021, noting the parties were not ready to proceed, Madam Justice Walkem adjourned the trial to April 11, 2022.

ANALYSIS
A. The Spousal Support Claim in this Case
[29] To claim spousal support in this case, Ms. Han must plead that she lived with Mr. Dorje in a marriage-like relationship. This is because only “spouses” are entitled to spousal support, and s. 3 of the Family Law Act defines a spouse as a person who is married or has lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship:

3 (1) A person is a spouse for the purposes of this Act if the person

(a) is married to another person, or

(b) has lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship, and

(i) has done so for a continuous period of at least 2 years, or

(ii) except in Parts 5 [Property Division] and 6 [Pension Division], has a child with the other person.

[30] Because she alleges she has a child with Mr. Dorje, Ms. Han need not allege that the relationship endured for a continuous period of two years to claim spousal support; but she must allege that she lived in a marriage-like relationship with him at some point in time. Accordingly, she must amend the notice of family claim.

B. The Test to Amend Pleadings
[31] Given that the notice of trial has been served, Ms. Han requires leave of the court to amend the notice of family claim: Supreme Court Family Rule 8-1(1)(b)(i).

[32] A person seeking to amend a notice of family claim must show that there is a reasonable cause of action. This is a low threshold. What the applicant needs to establish is that, if the facts pleaded are proven at trial, they would support a reasonable claim. The applicant’s allegations of fact are assumed to be true for the purposes of this analysis. Cantelon v. Wall, 2015 BCSC 813, at para. 7-8.

[33] The applicant’s delay, the reasons for the delay, and the prejudice to the responding party are also relevant factors. The ultimate consideration is whether it would be just and convenient to allow the amendment. Cantelon, at para. 6, citing Teal Cedar Products Ltd. v. Dale Intermediaries Ltd. et al (1986), 19 B.C.L.R. (3d) 282.

C. Pleadings in Family Law Cases
[34] Supreme Court Family Rules 3-1(1) and 4-1(1) require that a claim to spousal support be pleaded in a notice of family claim in Form F3. Section 2 of Form F3, “Spousal relationship history”, requires a spousal support claimant to check the boxes that apply to them, according to whether they are or have been married or are or have been in a marriage-like relationship. Where a claimant alleges a marriage-like relationship, Form F3 requires that they provide the date on which they began to live together with the respondent in a marriage-like relationship and, where applicable, the date on which they separated. Form F3 does not require a statement of the factual basis for the claim of spousal support.

[35] In this case, Ms. Han seeks to amend the notice of family claim to allege that she and Mr. Dorje began to live in a marriage-like relationship in or around January 2018, and separated in or around January 2019.

[36] An allegation that a person lived with a claimant in a marriage-like relationship is a conclusion of law, not an allegation of fact. Unlike the rules governing pleadings in civil actions, however, the Supreme Court Family Rules do not expressly require family law claimants to plead the material facts in support of conclusions of law.

[37] In other words, there is no express requirement in the Supreme Court Family Rules that Ms. Han plead the facts on which she relies for the allegation she and Mr. Dorje lived in a marriage-like relationship.

[38] Rule 4-6 authorizes a party to demand particulars, and then apply to the court for an order for further and better particulars, of a matter stated in a pleading. However, unless and until she is granted leave and files the proposed amended notice of family claim, Ms. Han’s allegation of a marriage-like relationship is not a matter stated in a pleading.

[39] Ms. Han filed an affidavit in support of her application to amend the notice of family claim. Normally, evidence would not be required or admissible on an application to amend a pleading. However, in the unusual circumstances of this case, the parties agreed I may look to Ms. Han’s affidavit and exhibits for the facts she pleads in support of the allegation of a marriage-like relationship.

[40] Because this is an application to amend - and Ms. Han’s allegations of fact are presumed to be true - I have not considered Mr. Dorje’s responding affidavit.

[41] Relying on affidavit evidence for an application to amend pleadings is less than ideal. It tends to merge and confuse the material facts with the evidence that would be relied on to prove those facts. In a number of places in her affidavit, for example, Ms. Han describes her feelings, impressions and understandings. A person’s hopes and intentions are not normally material facts unless they are mutual or reasonably held. The facts on which Ms. Han alleges she and Mr. Dorje formed a marriage-like relationship are more important for the present purposes than her belief they entered into a conjugal union.

[42] Somewhat unusually, in this case, almost all of the parties’ relevant communications were in writing. This makes it somewhat easier to separate the facts from the evidence; however, as stated above, it is difficult to understand the intentions and actions of a person from brief text messages.

[43] In my view, it would be a good practice for applicants who seek to amend their pleadings in family law cases to provide opposing counsel and the court with a schedule of the material facts on which they rely for the proposed amendment.

D. The Legal Concept of a Marriage-Like Relationship
[44] As Mr. Justice Myers observed in Mother 1 v. Solus Trust Company, 2019 BCSC 200, the concept of a marriage-like relationship is elastic and difficult to define. This elasticity is illustrated by the following passage from Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124, quoted by Myers J. at para. 133 of Mother 1:

[10] Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their relationships differently. In some relationships there is a complete blending of finances and property - in others, spouses keep their property and finances totally separate and in still others one spouse may totally control those aspects of the relationship with the other spouse having little or no knowledge or input. For some couples, sexual relations are very important - for others, that aspect may take a back seat to companionship. Some spouses do not share the same bed. There may be a variety of reasons for this such as health or personal choice. Some people are affectionate and demonstrative. They show their feelings for their “spouse” by holding hands, touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some “spouses” do everything together - others do nothing together. Some “spouses” vacation together and some spend their holidays apart. Some “spouses” have children - others do not. It is this variation in the way human beings structure their relationships that make the determination of when a “spousal relationship” exists difficult to determine. With married couples, the relationship is easy to establish. The marriage ceremony is a public declaration of their commitment and intent. Relationships outside marriage are much more difficult to ascertain. Rarely is there any type of “public” declaration of intent. Often people begin cohabiting with little forethought or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to “be together”. Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outside marriage because they did not want the legal obligations imposed by that status. Some individuals have simply given no thought as to how their relationship would operate. Often the date when the cohabitation actually began is blurred because people “ease into” situations, spending more and more time together. Agreements between people verifying when their relationship began and how it will operate often do not exist.

[45] In Mother 1, Mr. Justice Myers referred to a list of 22 factors grouped into seven categories, from Maldowich v. Penttinen, (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), that have frequently been cited in this and other courts for the purpose of determining whether a relationship was marriage-like, at para. 134 of Mother 1:

1. Shelter:

(a) Did the parties live under the same roof?

(b) What were the sleeping arrangements?

(c) Did anyone else occupy or share the available accommodation?

2. Sexual and Personal Behaviour:

(a) Did the parties have sexual relations? If not, why not?

(b) Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?

(c) What were their feelings toward each other?

(d) Did they communicate on a personal level?

(e) Did they eat their meals together?

(f) What, if anything, did they do to assist each other with problems or during illness?

(g) Did they buy gifts for each other on special occasions?

3. Services:

What was the conduct and habit of the parties in relation to:

(a) preparation of meals;

(b) washing and mending clothes;

(c) shopping;

(d) household maintenance; and

(e) any other domestic services?

4. Social:

(a) Did they participate together or separately in neighbourhood and community activities?

(b) What was the relationship and conduct of each of them toward members of their respective families and how did such families behave towards the parties?

5. Societal:

What was the attitude and conduct of the community toward each of them and as a couple?

6. Support (economic):

(a) What were the financial arrangements between the parties regarding the provision of or contribution toward the necessaries of life (food, clothing, shelter, recreation, etc.)?

(b) What were the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership of property?

(c) Was there any special financial arrangement between them which both agreed would be determinant of their overall relationship?

7. Children:

What was the attitude and conduct of the parties concerning children?

[46] In Austin v. Goerz, 2007 BCCA 586, the Court of Appeal cautioned against a “checklist approach”; rather, a court should "holistically" examine all the relevant factors. Cases like Molodowich provide helpful indicators of the sorts of behaviour that society associates with a marital relationship, the Court of Appeal said; however, “the presence or absence of any particular factor cannot be determinative of whether a relationship is marriage-like” (para. 58).

[47] In Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492, the Court of Appeal again affirmed that there is no checklist of characteristics that will be found in all marriages and then concluded with respect to evidence of intentions:

[23] The parties’ intentions – particularly the expectation that the relationship will be of lengthy, indeterminate duration – may be of importance in determining whether a relationship is “marriage-like”. While the court will consider the evidence expressly describing the parties’ intentions during the relationship, it will also test that evidence by considering whether the objective evidence is consonant with those intentions.

[24] The question of whether a relationship is “marriage-like” will also typically depend on more than just their intentions. Objective evidence of the parties’ lifestyle and interactions will also provide direct guidance on the question of whether the relationship was “marriage-like”.

[48] Significantly for this case, the courts have looked to mutual intent in order to find a marriage-like relationship. See, for example, L.E. v. D.J., 2011 BCSC 671 and Buell v. Unger, 2011 BCSC 35; Davey Estate v. Gruyaert, 2005 CarswellBC 3456 at 13 and 35.

[49] In Mother 1, Myers J. concluded his analysis of the law with the following learned comment:

[143] Having canvassed the law relating to the nature of a marriage-like relationship, I will digress to point out the problematic nature of the concept. It may be apparent from the above that determining whether a marriage-like relationship exists sometimes seems like sand running through one's fingers. Simply put, a marriage-like relationship is akin to a marriage without the formality of a marriage. But as the cases mentioned above have noted, people treat their marriages differently and have different conceptions of what marriage entails.

[50] In short, the determination of whether the parties in this case lived in a marriage-like relationship is a fact-specific inquiry that a trial judge would need to make on a “holistic” basis, having regard to all of the evidence. While the trial judge may consider the various factors listed in the authorities, those factors would not be treated as a checklist and no single factor or category of factors would be treated as being decisive.

E. Is There a Reasonable Claim of a Marriage-Like Relationship?
[51] In this case, many of the Molodowich factors are missing:

a) The parties never lived under the same roof. They never slept together. They were never in the same place at the same time during the relationship. The last time they saw each other in person was in November 2017, before the relationship began.

b) The parties never had consensual sex. They did not hug, kiss or hold hands. With the exception of the alleged sexual assault, they never touched one another physically.

c) The parties expressed care and affection for one another, but they rarely shared personal information or interest in their lives outside of their direct topic of communication. They did not write about their families, their friends, their religious beliefs or their work.

d) They expressed concern and support for one another when the other felt unwell or experienced health issues, but they did not provide any care or assistance during illness or other problems.

e) They did not assist one another with domestic chores.

f) They did not share their relationship with their peers or their community. There is no allegation, for example, that Mr. Dorje told his fellow monks or any of his followers about the relationship. There is no allegation that Ms. Han told her friends or any co-workers. Indeed, there is no allegation that anyone, with the exception of Ms. Han’s mother, knew about the relationship. Although Mr. Dorje gave Ms. Han’s mother a gift, he never met the mother and he never spoke to her.

g) They did not intend to have a child together. The child was conceived as a result of a sexual assault. While Mr. Dorje expressed interest in “meeting” the child, he never followed up. He currently has no relationship with the child. There is no allegation he has sought access or parenting arrangements.

[52] The only Molodowich factor of any real relevance in this case is economic support. Mr. Dorje provided the funds with which Ms. Han purchased a condominium. Mr. Dorje initially wrote that he wanted to buy a property with the money, but, he wrote, “It’s the same thing if you buy [it]”.

[53] Mr. Dorje also provided a significant amount of money for Ms. Han’s postpartum care and the child’s first year of life.

[54] This financial support may have been primarily for the benefit of the child. Even the condominium, Ms. Han wrote, was primarily for the benefit of the child.

[55] However, in my view, a trial judge may attach a broader significance to the financial support from Mr. Dorje than child support alone. A trial judge may find that the money Mr. Dorje provided to Ms. Han at her request was an expression of his commitment to her in circumstances in which he could not commit physically. The money and the gifts may be seen by the trial judge to have been a form of down payment by Mr. Dorje on a promise of continued emotional and financial support for Ms. Han, or, in Mr. Dorje’s own words, “Taking care of her and you are my duty for life” (emphasis added).

[56] On the other hand, I find it difficult to attach any particular significance to the fact that Mr. Dorje agreed to provide funds for Ms. Han to purchase a wedding ring. It appears to me that Ms. Han demanded that Mr. Dorje buy her a wedding ring, not that the ring had any mutual meaning to the parties as a marriage symbol. But it is relevant, in my view, that Mr. Dorje provided $20,000 USD to Ms. Han for something she wanted that was of no benefit to the child.

[57] Further, Ms. Han alleges that the parties intended to live together. At a minimum, a trial judge may find that the discussions about where Ms. Han and the child would live reflected a mutual intention of the parties to see one another and spend time together when they could.

[58] Mr. Dorje argues that an intention to live together at some point in the future is not sufficient to show that an existing relationship was marriage-like. He argues that the question of whether the relationship was marriage-like requires more than just intentions, citing Weber, supra.

[59] In my view, the documentary evidence referred to above provides some objective evidence in this case that the parties progressed beyond mere intentions. As stated, the parties appear to have expressed genuine care and affection for one another. They appear to have discussed marriage, trust, honesty, finances, mutual obligations and acquiring family property. These are not matters one would expect Mr. Dorje to discuss with a friend or a follower, or even with the mother of his child, without a marriage-like element of the relationship.

[60] A trial judge may find on the facts alleged by Ms. Han that the parties loved one another and would have lived together, but were unable to do so because of Mr. Dorje’s religious duties and nomadic lifestyle.

[61] The question I raised in the introduction to these reasons is whether a relationship that began on-line and never moved into the physical world can be marriage-like.

[62] Notably, the definition of a spouse in the Family Law Act does not require that the parties live together, only that they live with another person in a marriage-like relationship.

[63] In Connor Estate, 2017 BCSC 978, Mr. Justice Kent found that a couple that maintained two entirely separate households and never lived under the same roof formed a marriage-like relationship. (Connor Estate was decided under the intestacy provisions of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 13 ("WESA"), but courts have relied on cases decided under WESA and the FLA interchangeably for their definitions of a spouse.) Mr. Justice Kent found:

[50] The evidence is overwhelming and I find as a fact that Mr. Chambers and Ms. Connor loved and cared deeply about each other, and that they had a loving and intimate relationship for over 20 years that was far more than mere friendship or even so-called "friendship with benefits". I accept Mr. Chambers' evidence that he would have liked to share a home with Ms. Connor after the separation from his wife, but was unable to do so because of Ms. Connor's hoarding illness. The evidence amply supports, and I find as a fact, that Mr. Chambers and Ms. Connor loved each other, were faithful to each other, communicated with each other almost every day when they were not together, considered themselves to be (and presented themselves to be) "husband and wife" and were accepted by all who knew them as a couple.

[64] Connor Estate may be distinguishable from this case because Mr. Chambers and Ms. Connor were physically intimate for over 20 years, and presented themselves to the world as a married couple.

[65] Other decisions in which a marriage-like relationship has been found to exist despite the parties not living together have involved circumstances in which the couple lived under the same roof at previous points in the relationship, and the issue was whether they continued to be spouses after they took up separate residences: in Thompson v. Floyd, 2001 BCCA 78, the parties had lived together for a period of at least 11 years; in Roach v. Dutra, 2010 BCCA 264, the parties had lived together for approximately three years.

[66] However, as Mr. Justice Kent noted in Connor Estate:

[48] … [W]hile much guidance might be found in this case law, the simple fact is that no two cases are identical (and indeed they usually vary widely) and it is the assessment of evidence as a whole in this particular case which matters.

[67] Mr. Justice Kent concluded:

[53] Like human beings themselves, marriage-like relationships can come in many and various shapes. In this particular case, I have no doubt that such a relationship existed …

[68] As stated, Ms. Han’s claim is novel. It may even be weak. Almost all of the traditional factors are missing. The fact that Ms. Han and Mr. Dorje never lived under the same roof, never shared a bed and never even spent time together in person will militate against a finding they lived with one another in a marriage-like relationship. However, the traditional factors are not a mandatory check-list that confines the “elastic” concept of a marriage-like relationship. And if the COVID pandemic has taught us nothing else, it is that real relationships can form, blossom and end in virtual worlds.

[69] In my view, the merits of Ms. Han’s claim should be decided on the evidence. Subject to an overriding prejudice to Mr. Dorje, she should have leave to amend the notice of family claim. However, she should also provide meaningful particulars of the alleged marriage-like relationship.

F. Delay / Prejudice
[70] Ms. Han filed her notice of family claim on July 17, 2019. She brought this application to amend approximately one year and nine months after she filed the pleading, just over two months before the original trial date.

[71] Ms. Han’s delay was made all that more remarkable by her change in position from January 19, 2021, when she confirmed, through counsel, that she was not seeking spousal support in this case.

[72] Ms. Han gave notice of her intention to proceed with this application to Mr. Dorje on March 16, 2021. By the time the application was heard, the parties had conducted examinations for discovery without covering the issues that would arise from a claim of spousal support.

[73] Also, in April, Ms. Han produced additional documents, primarily text messages, that may be relevant to her claim of spousal support, but were undecipherable to counsel for Mr. Dorje, who does not read Mandarin.

[74] This application proceeded largely on documents selected and translated by counsel for Ms. Han. I was informed that Mandarin translations of the full materials would take 150 days.

[75] Understandably in the circumstances, Mr. Dorje argued that an amendment two months before trial would be neither just nor convenient. He argued that he would be prejudiced by an adjournment so as to allow Ms. Han to advance a late claim of spousal support.

[76] The circumstances changed on May 6, 2021, when Madam Justice Walkem adjourned the trial to July 2022 and reset it for 25 days. Madam Justice Walkem noted that most of the witnesses live internationally and require translators. She also noted that paternity may be in issue, and Mr. Dorje may amend his pleadings to raise that issue. It seems clear that, altogether apart from the potential spousal support claim, the parties were not ready to proceed to trial on June 7, 2021.

[77] In my view, any remaining prejudice to Mr. Dorje is outweighed by the importance of having all of the issues between the parties decided on their merits.

[78] Ms. Han’s delay and changes of position on spousal support may be a matter to de addressed in a future order of costs; but they are not grounds on which to deny her leave to amend the notice of family claim.

CONCLUSION
[79] Ms. Han is granted leave to amend her notice of family claim in the form attached as Appendix A to the notice of application to include a claim for spousal support.

[80] Within 21 days, or such other deadline as the parties may agree, Ms. Han must provide particulars of the marriage-like relationship alleged in the amended notice of family claim.

[81] Ms. Han is entitled to costs of this application in the cause of the spousal support claim.

“Master Elwood”